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Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization 
MICHAEL SIMKOVIC* 
U.S. policy makers often treat market competition as a panacea. However, in the 
case of mortgage securitization, policy makers’ faith in competition is misplaced. 
Competitive mortgage securitization has been tried three times in U.S. history—
during the 1880s, the 1920s, and the 2000s—and every time it has collapsed. Most 
recently, competition between mortgage securitizers led to a race to the bottom on 
mortgage underwriting standards that ended in the late 2000s financial crisis. This 
Article provides original evidence that when competition was less intense and 
securitizers had more buyer power, securitizers acted to monitor mortgage 
originators and to maintain prudent underwriting. However, securitizers’ ability to 
monitor originators and maintain high standards was undermined as competition 
shifted power away from securitizers and toward originators. Although standards 
declined across the market, the largest and most powerful of the mortgage 
securitizers, the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), remained more 
successful than other mortgage securitizers at maintaining prudent underwriting. 
This Article proposes reforms based on lessons from the recent financial crisis: 
merge the GSEs with various government agencies’ mortgage operations to create 
a single dedicated mortgage securitization agency that would seek to maintain 
market stability, improve underwriting, and provide a long-term investment return 
for the benefit of taxpayers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
U.S. policy makers often assume that market competition is a panacea. This 
faith in competition motivates proposals by the U.S. Department of Treasury (the 
“Treasury”) to radically transform the U.S. residential mortgage market. However, 
in the case of mortgage securitization, policy makers’ faith in competition1 is 
misplaced. Competitive mortgage securitization has been tried three times in U.S. 
history—during the 1880s, the 1920s, and the 2000s—and every time it has 
collapsed in a destructive financial and economic crisis.2 
Securitization is a method of financing whereby loan receivables or other cash 
flows are bundled into securities and sold to investors.3 Mortgage securitization 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See infra notes 139–45 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra Figures 1–3; notes 14–30 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for 
Home Loans, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681, 688–90 (2010); Kenneth C. Kettering, 
Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1569–74 (2008); Stephen J. Lubben, Beyond True Sales: 
Securitization and Chapter 11, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 89, 92–96 (2004); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
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divides lending into four functions generally handled by four different types of 
specialized financial institutions: origination, the initial step of making loans to 
individual borrowers; servicing, managing the ongoing relationship with individual 
borrowers and collecting payments; securitization, buying large numbers of loans 
from originators and packaging those loans into investments that can be sold to 
investors; and funding, buying mortgage backed securities (MBS) from securitizers 
and holding them in portfolio as an investment. 
Securitization can provide a long-term source of funding and thereby reduce 
financial institutions’ exposure to fluctuations in prevailing interest rates. 
Traditional depository institutions fund long-term fixed rate mortgages with short-
term deposits. Because of the duration mismatch, if interest rates increase, 
depository institutions face rising funding costs and declining loan portfolio values. 
Securitization can transfer interest rate risk from financial institutions to 
professional fixed income investors. Indeed, securitization reemerged in the United 
States shortly after the devastation caused by the rising interest rate environment of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Securitization can also be used to transfer the loan-specific risk that borrowers 
will default or fail to repay their loans. After securitization, institutions that 
originate or service mortgages will generally have the best information about 
mortgage default risk because originators may have collected private information 
about borrowers during their initial intake and because servicers are the first to 
know about delinquent payments. However, investors with less information about 
default risk and less expertise in the mortgage market will bear much of that default 
risk.4 That is, unless an extremely well-capitalized financial institution or the 
government fully guarantees the underlying mortgages. 
In the mid-2000s, competition between mortgage securitizers for loans led to 
deteriorating mortgage underwriting standards and a race to the bottom that ended 
in the late 2000s financial crisis.5 Underwriting prevents losses at the front end by 
basing loan approval decisions and lending terms on data-driven predictions of the 
likelihood of default, or failure to repay, and the severity of losses to lenders in the 
event of default. Loose underwriting involves making loans that are likely to 
default. 
This Article provides evidence that when competition was less intense and 
securitizers had more buyer power, securitizers acted to monitor mortgage 
originators and to maintain prudent underwriting.6 However, securitizers’ ability to 
monitor originators and maintain high standards was undermined as competition 
shifted buyer power away from securitizers and consolidation increased 
originators’ supplier power.7 These changes in market structure and market power 
match the specific timing of the dramatic deterioration in underwriting standards 
                                                                                                                 
The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STANFORD J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135–36 (1994); 
Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 
284–88 (2009) [hereinafter Simkovic, Secret Liens]. 
 4. See DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION, AND THE 
UNDERMINING OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE MARKET 99–111 (2009); Kathryn Judge, 
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 
STAN. L. REV. 657, 690–93 (2012). 
 5. See infra Part III.A. 
 6. See infra Part III.B. 
 7. See infra Part III.C–E. 
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and vintage loan performance in the mid-2000s that contributed to the crisis.8 
Furthermore, although standards declined across the market, the largest and most 
powerful of the mortgage securitizers, the Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs), remained more successful than other mortgage securitizers at maintaining 
prudent underwriting.9 
Competitive pressures exacerbated private financial institutions’ strong 
incentives to take risks.10 Whereas private investors and managers capture most of 
the upside of mortgage lending, taxpayers bear much of the downside risk because 
of the cyclicality of default risk, limited liability, and public safety nets.11 Because 
financial institution bailouts are routine, private financial institutions rationally 
prefer to take more risk than is optimal for taxpayers while government agencies 
rationally prefer to limit risk.12 
These findings have profound implications for post-crisis reform of U.S. 
residential mortgage finance. This Article concludes that, notwithstanding recent 
financial regulation reforms, fragmentation of the mortgage securitization market 
may still lead to greater risk taking by mortgage originators, future public bailouts 
of private financial institutions may be inevitable, and a reprivatized, fragmented 
securitization market could ultimately prove more dangerous to taxpayers than the 
post-crisis status quo of de facto government monopoly.13 Though not definitive, 
the evidence presented in this Article raises serious concerns that should be 
addressed before the Treasury proceeds with radical reform of U.S. housing 
finance. 
This Article proposes reforms based on lessons from the recent financial crisis 
and the United States’ successful and stable post-WWII mortgage market. Because 
securitizer buyer power is an important determinant of stability and prudent 
underwriting, buyer power should be increased by merging the GSEs with various 
government agencies’ mortgage operations to create a single, dedicated mortgage 
securitization agency that would seek to maintain market stability, improve 
underwriting, and provide a long term investment return for the benefit of 
taxpayers. 
I. A HISTORY OF MARKET FAILURES AND GOVERNMENT RESCUES 
Private investors have not been very successful at evaluating the complex risks 
associated with pools of mortgages. Unlike equities, which announce their riskiness 
to investors by virtue of their first-loss position in corporate capital structures, 
mortgage securitization promises investors the safety of secured lending against 
sound collateral. However, each of the three times competitive mortgage 
securitization by competing private financial institutions has been tried, it delivered 
much higher risk levels than investors expected, and each time the market 
ultimately collapsed. An early form of private mortgage securitization was tried in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See infra Part III.A. 
 9. See infra Part III.F. 
 10. See infra Part V.A. 
 11. See infra Part V.B. 
 12. See infra Parts V–VI. 
 13. See infra Part VII. 
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the late 1800s and failed in the 1890s.14 Another variation on private mortgage 
securitization failed in the late 1920s.15 Whereas equity markets have survived 
periodic boom and bust cycles and investors tolerate losses and still reinvest in 
equities, competitive mortgage securitization effectively disappeared from U.S. 
housing finance for decades after each of its two previous failures. The fragility of 
mortgage markets has contributed to a perceived need for increased public 
oversight and support. 
Mortgage securitization first emerged in the western United States in the late 
1800s to finance farm mortgages.16 Prior to securitization, farm mortgages were 
financed through a process called “mortgage brokerage,” which connected western 
borrowers with northeastern and European investors.17 Mortgage brokers with 
offices in rural areas originated, serviced, and then sold individual farm mortgages 
to investors.18 Investors reviewed and could accept or reject each individual loan.19  
Because loans were individually reviewed by investors, mortgage brokerage 
provided credit to only the most creditworthy borrowers who borrowed under 
standard terms. However, underwriting standards became more flexible and credit 
more widely available to higher risk borrowers once mortgage brokers developed 
an early form of securitization (modeled on structures that had been used in 
Europe).20 These early securitizations were structured as trusts that owned a few 
hundred mortgages and that issued debentures (or bonds) to investors.21 The trusts 
were simple pass-through entities that allowed for risk pooling and 
diversification.22 Investors generally did not review individual mortgages, relying 
instead on the good reputations and creditworthiness of the mortgage companies 
that organized the trusts.23 Unlike in Europe, regulation of U.S. securitizations was 
minimal, and over time, underwriting standards and the quality of the collateral 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. Kenneth A. Snowden, Mortgage Companies and Mortgage Securitization in the Late 
Nineteenth Century 31–32 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Snowden, 
Mortgage], available at http://www.uncg.edu/bae/people/snowden/Wat_jmcb_aug07.pdf. 
 15. William N. Goetzmann & Frank Newman, Securitization in the 1920’s 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15650, 2010), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15650; Kenneth A. Snowden, The Anatomy of a Residential 
Mortgage Crisis: A Look Back to the 1930s 11–12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 16244, 2010) [hereinafter Snowden, Anatomy], available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16244. 
 16. Snowden, Mortgage, supra note 14, at 1. 
 17. Id. at 3–4. 
 18. See Snowden, Mortgage, supra note 14, at 4–5. 
 19. Id. at 5–6. 
 20. Id. at 1, 3 (“[D]ebentures offered a low-cost mechanism for marketing loans that 
were too risky, or non-standard in form, to be brokered.”). 
 21. Id. at 9. 
 22. Id. at 9–13. By contrast, private securitization in the late twentieth century was more 
complex because investors could invest in different tranches, which carried different risk 
levels based on a system of priorities for cash flows from the mortgage pool. Id. at 11; 
IMMERGLUCK, supra note 4, at 34–41. 
 23. Snowden, Mortgage, supra note 14, at 14–16. 
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deteriorated.24 Many abuses were documented, including the use of already 
defaulted mortgages as collateral.25 After a financial crisis devastated many of the 
western mortgage companies in the 1890s, private mortgage securitization largely 
disappeared from the United States for several decades.26 
Private mortgage securitization returned in the 1910s and 1920s, this time in an 
urban context, as northeastern title insurance companies began to insure against 
mortgage default, place those insured mortgages into trust accounts, and sell 
investors participation certificates backed by the pools of insured mortgages.27 As 
with mortgage securitization in the late 1800s, investors focused on the 
creditworthiness of the financial institutions that organized the mortgage pool—in 
this case, the title insurance companies—rather than the individual loans.28 As in 
the 1800s, the quality of the underlying collateral was problematic, fraud was 
endemic, and the insurance companies proved to be too thinly capitalized to make 
good on their guarantees amid high defaults.29 During the late 1920s and early 
1930s, the secondary mortgage market again collapsed.30 
After the second failure of private mortgage securitization and the Great 
Depression, the U.S. government started to play a more active role in housing 
finance—bearing credit risk, allocating capital, and—under very limited 
circumstances—originating loans. The federal government bore credit risk by 
insuring mortgages through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), established 
in 1934;31 the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) loan guarantee program, 
established in 1944;32 and the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), established 
in 1946.33 The government also bore credit risk by buying mortgages through the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), originally established as a 
division of the government in 1938.34 A government agency originated a very large 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. Id. at 27–30; Housing Finance Reform: Should There Be a Government Guarantee? 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. at 5–7 (2011) 
[hereinafter Housing Finance Reform]. 
 25. Snowden, Mortgage, supra note 14, at 31–32, 48 n.55. 
 26.  Id. at 31–32. 
 27. Housing Finance Reform, supra note 24, at 54–55 (statement of Adam J. Levitin, 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Ctr.). Scholars have also identified other 
structures used in the 1920s as forerunners of modern securitization, but the structure used 
by title insurance companies probably bears the closest resemblance to modern 
securitization. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.; Snowden, Anatomy, supra note 15, at 11–19. 
 31. Fred Wright, The Effect of New Deal Real Estate Residential Finance and 
Foreclosure Policies Made in Response to the Real Estate Conditions of the Great 
Depression, 57 ALA. L. REV. 231, 251 (2005). 
 32. Bernard P. Ingold, The Department of Veterans’ Affairs Home Loan Guaranty 
Program: Friend or Foe?, 132 MIL. L. REV. 231, 232–33 (1991). 
 33. Susan A. Schneider, Financing the Agricultural Operation: Recent Developments 
and Current Trends, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 215, 230 (1999). 
 34. Robert Higgs, Cumulating Policy Consequences, Frightened Overreactions, and the 
Current Surge of Government’s Size, Scope, and Power, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 531, 
539 (2010). 
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number of mortgage loans during the Great Depression,35 but the government rarely 
originates loans today.36 
Fannie Mae was privatized in 1968 to shrink the federal government’s balance 
sheet, although it was generally assumed by investors that the federal government 
would rescue Fannie Mae if it ever became insolvent.37 Because of its origins as a 
government agency, Fannie Mae is referred to as a GSE and its securities are 
sometimes referred to as “Agency” securities. In 1970, a similar GSE, the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), was created to serve a slightly 
different set of mortgage originators and to compete with Fannie Mae.38 After the 
privatization of Fannie Mae in 1968, the government continued to directly bear 
credit risk by guaranteeing mortgage-backed securities through another government 
agency, the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”).39 The 
government allocates capital through laws, regulations, and policies that limit 
eligibility for government mortgage programs and set credit standards and 
pricing.40 
Large-scale private mortgage securitization by non-GSEs reemerged in the early 
1980s.41 In the mid-2000s, competition between mortgage securitizers—large 
investment banks, commercial banks, and the GSEs—intensified, with non-GSE 
securitization overtaking GSE securitization in 2005.42 After extremely high default 
rates for securitized subprime mortgages, private non-GSE securitization collapsed 
in late 2007 and early 2008.43 The U.S. government provided low cost capital, 
guarantees, and other public support to both GSEs and large non-GSE securitizers. 
The GSEs were effectively renationalized in September of 2008, while other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. Snowden, Anatomy, supra note 15, at 21–22 (“[The Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation opened] 400 offices throughout the country and employ[ed] a staff of 20000 to 
process loans and appraise properties. In only three years the agency received applications 
from 40 percent of all residential mortgagors and wrote new loans on ten percent of the 
owner-occupied homes in the U.S.”). 
 36. There is one notable exception. The government lends directly for purchase, 
construction, or improvement of homes on Native American trust land through the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. John McGee Ingram, Home Ownership Opportunities in 
Indian Country, 7 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 164, 174 (1998). 
 37. Company Overview, FANNIE MAE, 
http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=aboutus; see also Krishna Guha, Saskia 
Scholtes &James Politi, Saviours of the Suburbs; But Are America’s Two Main Home Lenders 
at Risk?, FIN. TIMES, June 4, 2008, at 9. 
 38. Freddie Mac was created by the government as a private company. Company 
Profile, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/; Guha et. al, 
supra note 37. 
 39. About Ginnie Mae, GINNIE MAE, 
http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/history.asp?subTitle=About. Ginnie Mae is backed by the 
full faith and credit of the U.S. government. Id. Technically, Ginnie Mae does not actually 
securitize mortgages; it guarantees MBS comprised of loans insured by the FHA or 
guaranteed by the VA. Id. 
 40. See Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and 
Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 845 (1995). 
 41. See infra Figure 2. 
 42. See infra Figure 2. 
 43. See infra Figures 2, 6. 
220 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:213 
 
financial institutions remained privately owned.44 The recent mortgage crisis is at 
least the third failure of private mortgage securitization in U.S. history. Figures 1, 
2, and 3 below document the almost complete collapse of private mortgage 
securitization. 
Figure 1 shows that mortgage lending fell sharply during the crisis and that the 
few mortgages that were being originated increasingly depended on securitization 
as a source of funding. The columns are scaled to the left axis and show mortgage 
origination volume plummeting in 2007 and 2008. Origination volume remained at 
low levels through 2010. The line, scaled to the right axis, shows the percent of 
originated mortgages that were funded through securitization skyrocketing starting 
in 2007, reaching roughly 85% by 2009. 
 
Figure 1: While home mortgage origination volume has fallen to below 2001 
levels, securitization rates have climbed to record highs since 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. In September 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) became the 
conservator of the GSEs. In connection with the conservatorship, the Treasury committed to 
fund any shortfalls in their net worth. EDWARD J. DEMARCO, FHFA, A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR 
ENTERPRISE CONSERVATORSHIPS: THE NEXT CHAPTER IN A STORY THAT NEEDS AN ENDING 5 
(2012). 
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Figure 2 shows that private securitization almost completely disappeared after 
the crisis and the secondary market came to depend on government support. The 
line, scaled to the left axis, shows the volume of mortgage backed securities 
issuance—the total secondary market size. The area chart, scaled to the right axis, 
shows the relative market share of the GSEs and federal government agencies 
(“Agency”) versus private label securitizers (“Nonagency”). The percent of 
securitized mortgages that were securitized or guaranteed by Agencies is 
represented by the lighter shade at the bottom, and the percent of securitized 
mortgages that were securitized by private label securitizers is represented by the 
darker shade at the top. The chart shows Agency market share declining slowly 
through 2003, then plummeting in the mid-2000s, and then shooting up after the 
crisis in 2008 and beyond. By 2008, Agency share exceeded 95% of the market. In 
other words, in the post-crisis environment, almost all secondary market issuance 
was conducted through agencies affiliated with the federal government.  
 
Figure 2: After the financial crisis, GSE/Agency market share of mortgage 
securitization shot up to 95%, the highest government share in twenty years 
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Figure 3 shows who ultimately purchased mortgage backed securities during 
and after the crisis. Whereas most investors were shedding mortgage backed 
securities from 2007 on, the Treasury and Federal Reserve dramatically increased 
their holdings. Government-affiliated agencies were not only securitizing 
mortgages and selling MBS—they were also buying MBS to prop up the market. 
 
Figure 3: The Federal Reserve and Treasury have dramatically increased 
MBS purchases while most private investors stopped buying MBS  
 
 
II. COMPETITION, SUPPLIER POWER, AND THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM 
As discussed in greater detail below, the Treasury and a number of experts have 
expressed concern about the extent of government involvement in mortgage finance 
and would like to restore a competitive, private market. However, the role of 
competition as a contributing cause of the mortgage crisis suggests that 
privatization could lead to instability and future losses for taxpayers. 
Traditional economic theory generally suggests that greater competition 
between financial institutions leads to more risk taking and more frequent financial 
crises.45 To explain this inverse relation between stability and competition, scholars 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. See Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ross Levine, Bank Concentration and 
Fragility: Impact and Mechanics, in THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 193, 193–94 
(Mark S. Carey & René M. Stulz eds., 2006); Elena Carletti, Competition and Regulation in 
Banking, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND BANKING 449, 450–51 (Anjan 
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have proposed several possible mechanisms of action. According to the “franchise 
value” hypothesis, increased competition reduces the profitability and value of 
financial institutions and encourages their managers to take greater risks to try to 
increase returns.46 According to the screening hypothesis, increased competition 
undermines financial institutions’ ability to screen borrowers, because the 
institution may not wish to invest as much in screening borrowers who may 
ultimately take their business elsewhere and because the institution will have less 
information about borrowers who deal with multiple institutions.47 At least one 
theoretical paper has suggested that in a fragmented, competitive mortgage market, 
the underpricing of mortgage risk may be inevitable.48 The traditional view that 
competition reduces stability is supported by empirical studies of the United States 
and a handful of other countries.49 
                                                                                                                 
V. Thakor & Arnoud W. A. Boot eds., 2008) (arguing that an increase in the number of 
competitors undermines bank screening tests for borrower creditworthiness); Thomas F. 
Hellmann, Kevin C. Murdock & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Liberalization, Moral Hazard in 
Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?, 90 AM. ECON. 
REV. 147, 147–49 (2000) (arguing that reduced competition and greater profits create 
“franchise value” that reduces banks’ incentives to take risks and thereby reduces financial 
system fragility); Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in 
Banking, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1183, 1183–85 (1990) (finding that the surge of bank failures 
in the United States during the 1980s was caused by deregulation and market pressures that 
reduced banks’ monopoly rents and incentivized greater risk taking); Carmen Matutes & 
Xavier Vives, Imperfect Competition, Risk Taking, and Regulation in Banking, 44 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 1, 2–4 (2000); Allen N. Berger, Leora F. Klapper & Rima Turk-Ariss, Bank 
Competition and Financial Stability 1 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 4696, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1243102 (“Under the traditional ‘competition-fragility’ 
view, more bank competition erodes market power . . . . This encourages banking 
organizations to take on more risk to increase returns.”). 
 46. Hellmann et al., supra note 45, at 148. 
 47. Carletti, supra note 45, at 461–63. 
 48. Andrey Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, The Inevitability of Marketwide Underpricing 
of Mortgage Default Risk, 34 REAL EST. ECON. 479, 479–80 (2006). 
 49. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION, CONCENTRATION AND 
STABILITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR 17–32 (2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/46/46040053.pdf; Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 
Competition and Financial Stability, 36 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 453, 453–80 (2004) 
(finding that concentration increases stability); Carletti, supra note 45, at 450–51; Hellmann et 
al., supra note 45, at 147–65; Keeley, supra note 45, at 1183–98; Michael D. Bordo, Hugh 
Rockoff & Angela Redish, A Comparison of the United States and Canadian Banking Systems 
in the Twentieth Century: Stability vs. Efficiency? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 4546, 1993), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=288470 (arguing that from 1920 to 
1980, the more concentrated Canadian banking system was more profitable, more efficient, and 
more stable than the less concentrated U.S. banking system); Zuzana Fungacova & Laurent 
Weill, How Market Power Influences Bank Failures: Evidence from Russia (Bank of Fin. & 
Université de Strasbourg, Discussion Paper, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1343173 (finding that for Russian banks from 2001 to 2007, 
competition as measured by the Lerner Index reduced financial system stability); Gabriel 
Jiménez, Jose A. Lopez & Jesús Saurina, How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk-Taking? 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2007-23, 2007), available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2007/wp07-23bk.pdf (finding that less 
competition as measured by the Lerner Index is associated with better loan performance for 
Spanish banks). 
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The traditional view, though still dominant, has been challenged by some studies 
of select non-U.S. markets and by studies that measure competition using alternate 
measures such as barriers to entry, pricing, and profit margins.50 These varied 
results suggest that it may be risky to generalize about the impact of competition 
and that specific financial markets should be studied individually in depth. Because 
of the importance of definitional and contextual issues,51 this Article will limit its 
analysis to the impact of competition, defined with respect to market concentration, 
in the specific institutional context of the U.S. residential mortgage securitization 
market. 
Although many of the traditional studies of competition and underwriting have 
focused on competition between vertically integrated financial institutions, similar 
dynamics may be at work in the context of mortgage securitization. In a vertically 
disintegrated mortgage securitization market, prudent mortgage underwriting can 
be promoted or undermined by any entity that has the knowledge and power to 
influence originators’ loan approval decisions. These entities may include 
originators themselves, securitizers such as GSEs and private banks that purchased 
individual loans from originators and packaged them for sale to investors, credit 
rating agencies, investors, or regulators.52 
Underwriting shifted toward riskier loans in the years leading up to the financial 
crisis, especially from 2004 to 2007.53 As will be shown below, these were the 
years in which the securitization market became far less concentrated, origination 
became more concentrated, and buyer power of GSEs declined relative to supplier 
power of originators.54 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. Beck et al., supra note 45, at 223–24 (arguing that competition may not increase 
fragility); John H. Boyd & Gianni De Nicoló, The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and 
Competition Revisited, 60 J. FIN. 1329, 1329–43 (2005); Ramon Caminal & Carmen Matutes, 
Market Power and Banking Failures, 20 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1341, 1341–61 (2002), available 
at http://www.iae.csic.es/investigatorsMaterial/a9167113500archivoPdf20526.pdf; Klaus 
Schaeck, Martin Cihak & Simon Wolfe, Are Competitive Banking Systems More Stable?, 41 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 711, 711–34 (2009) (finding that concentration and competition 
are both associated with greater financial system stability); Berger et al., supra note 45, at 16 
(arguing that information collected in twenty-three industrial nations supports a link between 
competition and fragility, but other dynamics may be at work). 
 51. See Beck et al., supra note 45, at 223–24 (finding that higher banking industry 
concentration relates to lower risk of financial crisis, but arguing that this relation may be 
mediated by some factor other than competition); Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, What 
Drives Bank Competition?: Some International Evidence, 36 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 
563, 563–83 (2004); Schaeck et al., supra note 50, at 730. 
 52. See IMMERGLUCK, supra note 4, at 99–112. 
 53. ERIC S. BELSKY & NELA RICHARDSON, UNDERSTANDING THE BOOM AND BUST IN 
NONPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING 5–8 (2010), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/ubb10-1.pdf; PRESIDENT’S WORKING 
GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2008) (“The 
turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting 
standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into early 2007.”) 
(emphasis omitted); Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1848, 1875–76 (2011). 
 54. See EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, HOUSING FINANCE IN THE EURO AREA 74 (2009) 
(“Interestingly, the lending boom in the United States has coincided with the imposition of 
limits on the activity of GSEs, which triggered increased competition from new entrants.”). 
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Scholars, government commissions, and others have identified many possible 
causes of the financial crisis of the late 2000s.55 This Article focuses primarily on 
competitive dynamics and also discusses a limited subset of other possible 
contributing causes. The focused analysis in this Article is not meant to deny the 
importance of other contributing causes but rather to highlight factors that have not 
been adequately discussed in the literature and whose implications have been 
overlooked by leading proposals for market reform. 
A. Mortgage Underwriting Deteriorated from 2004 to 2007 
Both ex ante information about changes in loan characteristics over time and ex 
post loan performance suggest that loan quality was relatively stable or improving 
from 2000 to 2003 and then deteriorated sharply from 2004 to 2007.  
Evidence of deteriorating underwriting standards in 2004 to 2007 includes a 
dramatic shift away from relatively safe loan categories to relatively risky loan 
categories. The origination market product mix shifted from relatively safe 
mortgages—including conventional conforming mortgages typically sold to the 
GSEs, FHA and VA loans, and private Jumbo loans which were generally high 
quality but were above the GSEs maximum loan limits—toward riskier mortgages, 
including subprime loans, Alt-A (low-documentation) loans, and second lien home 
equity loans. 
Figure 4 below shows this dramatic shift. The bottom three shades are relatively 
safe loans while the top three shades are relatively riskier loans. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 1 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 231 (2011); Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad 
Job Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585 (2010); Benjamin J. Keys, 
Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? 
Evidence from Subprime Loans, 125 Q.J. ECON. 307 (2010); Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The 
Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default 
Crisis, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1449 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: 
Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008). These 
include, but are not limited to, conflicts of interest at credit rating agencies and overly 
optimistic credit ratings for MBS; ample liquidity, low interest rates, and investors reaching 
for higher yields; moral hazard and information inefficiencies related to securitization; 
conflicts of interest and information inefficiencies related to financial innovations such as 
collateralized debt obligations; limited liability, high leverage, and financial executives’ 
incentivized to take big risks; fragmented and light-touch regulation; and possibly affordable 
housing policies. 
226 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:213 
 
Figure 4: From 2004 to 2007, origination shifted dramatically away from 
safe prime mortgages toward risky, subprime and Alt-A mortgages and home 
equity loans 
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Conventional conforming mortgages experienced the most sudden and dramatic 
declines, losing almost half of their market share in two years.56 Subprime 
mortgages increased dramatically, from approximately 7–8% of the market in 2000 
to 2003, to approximately 18–20% in 2004 to 2006.57 
Deteriorating underwriting standards were also manifest in the proliferation of 
nontraditional mortgage loan features, such as adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs),58 
interest only mortgages, pay option mortgages, and mortgages with large final 
payments known as balloon payments.59 The market share of loans with these 
features increased dramatically from 2004 to 2007.60 Simultaneous second 
mortgages (also called “piggyback” loans) proliferated, and combined-loan-to-
value ratios climbed.61 The percent of loans with full documentation fell from the 
first quarter of 2005, bottoming out in the subprime market in late 2006 and in the 
prime and Alt-A markets in early 2007.62 
Further evidence of deteriorating underwriting from 2004 to 2007 comes from 
assessments by national bank examiners that underwriting standards tightened from 
2000 to 2003, then loosened from 2004 to 2007. Figure 5 below shows the net 
percent of national bank examiners who reported tightening residential mortgage 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Conventional conforming mortgages increased their market share from 2000 to 
2003, increasing from 47% to 62%, then plummeted from 2004 to 2006, reaching a low of 
33% in 2006, and began to recover thereafter. FHA and VA loans experienced steady 
declines, falling from 11% in 2000 to 3% in 2006. Private Jumbo loans experienced a 
gradual decline, peaking at 25% in 1999 and declining thereafter. 
 57. Alt-A loans also increased from 1–3% in 1990 to 2003 to 7–11% in 2004, with a 
peak of 13% in 2006. Home equity loans’ market share doubled, from about 5–6% in 2003 
to 11–14% in 2004 to 2007. 
 58. BELSKY & RICHARDSON, supra note 53, at 38, 159 (using First American CoreLogic, 
LoanPerformance data to show that subprime loans shifted from primarily fixed rate 
mortgages (FRMs) to ARMs). ARMs are far more likely to default than FRMs, as shown in 
Figure 12. ARMs are default prone because the required monthly payments can dramatically 
increase as short-term interest rates increase, whereas borrowers’ capacity to pay (i.e, 
monthly income) typically does not increase as short-term interest rates increase. ARMs also 
often feature low initial teaser rates which reset to higher floating rates after a few years. See 
id. at 39, 160 fig.2-6. The choice between ARMs and FRMs is essentially a question of who 
should forecast and hedge interest rate risk—individual retail borrowers or sophisticated 
financial professionals working at large institutions. 
 59. Interest only, pay option, and balloon payment mortgages are risky because they 
amortize more slowly than traditional mortgages and therefore loan-to-value ratios remain 
higher for a longer period of time. Underwriting often relies on optimistic projections of 
rising borrower income, rising home prices, and ample opportunities to refinance. These 
mortgages may have low short-term default rates because required payments are initially 
low, but they will typically have either higher long-term default rates or higher loss rates in 
the event of default. 
 60. BELSKY & RICHARDSON, supra note 53, at 159 fig.2-5; see also 1 INSIDE MORTG. 
FIN., THE 2011 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL 23 (2011). 
 61. BELSKY & RICHARDSON, supra note 53, at 36; IVY L. ZELMAN, DENNIS MCGILL, 
JUSTIN SPEER & ALAN RATNER, MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY DU JOUR: UNDERESTIMATED NO MORE 
34 (2007) (Credit Suisse equity research), available at http://seattlebubble.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2007/10/2007-03-credit-suisse-mortgage-liquidity-du-jour.pdf. 
 62. BELSKY & RICHARDSON, supra note 53, at 39, 161 fig.2-7. 
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underwriting standards in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) 
annual survey of bank examiners. 
 
Figure 5: Underwriting standards tightened from 2000 to 2003, eased from 
2004 to 2007, then tightened sharply after the mortgage crisis 
 
 
The OCC’s annual survey reported that for both commercial and retail lending, 
banks that eased underwriting standards did so primarily because of competition.63 
These changes in underlying loan quality are largely consistent with the 
subsequent pattern of loan performance. Figure 6 below shows the percent of loans 
that were more than sixty days delinquent, by months since origination.64 Each line 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SURVEY OF CREDIT UNDERWRITING 
STANDARDS 4–5 (2005); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SURVEY OF CREDIT 
UNDERWRITING STANDARDS 6 (2006); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
SURVEY OF CREDIT UNDERWRITING STANDARDS 3, 5 (2007). 
 64. A similar analysis appeared in an October 2008 publication by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: 
FINANCIAL STRESS AND DELEVERAGING: MACROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY 12 
fig.1.8 (2008). The IMF’s analysis showed essentially the same pattern of improving 
performance from 2000 to 2003, followed by deteriorating performance from 2004 to 2007, 
but delinquencies were scaled by original loan balance instead of by current balance. Id. Two 
researchers at the IMF who prepared the original analysis, Narayan Suryakumar and 
Rebecca McCaughrin, graciously shared updated data and provided guidance. The advantage 
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represents a different vintage year; the time scale on the x-axis is relative to the 
date of origination. A more steeply upward sloping line for a given vintage year 
suggests a higher percentage of delinquent loans within a shorter period of time 
since origination, and therefore poorer performance.  
Three charts are presented, one for subprime loans, one for Alt-A (low-
documentation) loans, and one for prime loans. 
 
Figure 6: Loan performance by vintage improved from 2000 to 2003 and 
then deteriorated from 2004 to 2007 
 
                                                                                                                 
of scaling the data by the current balance is that the resulting performance figures are less 
likely to be skewed by differences across vintages in refinancing and loan modification rates. 
Reported delinquency rates are generally higher than they would be if scaled by original loan 
balance. 
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Loan quality at origination may not fully explain the pattern of subsequent loan 
performance; economic shocks after origination such as changes in housing values, 
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unemployment, and liquidity also play a role.65 The overall pattern of changes in 
unemployment should make 2000 to 2003 vintage loans perform worse relative to 
2004 to 2006 vintage loans, and therefore bolsters support for the claim that 
underwriting loosened from 2004 to 2006.66 
The impact of housing price changes is somewhat more challenging to interpret. 
The pattern of changes in housing prices could make later loans perform worse, 
even with consistent underwriting standards.67 However, declines in housing prices 
may have been foreseeable. In the early to mid-2000s, a number of scholars and 
regulators argued that housing was overpriced.68 They noted deviations from 
historic relationships between housing prices and rental prices, as well as between 
housing prices and economic fundamentals such as wages, employment, and 
population levels. Nevertheless, mortgage lenders continued to make loans that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. The existing literature suggests that changes in unemployment levels and housing 
prices are particularly good predictors of default. See generally Karl E. Case, Robert J. 
Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Mortgage Default Risk and Real Estate Prices: The Use of Index-
Based Futures and Options in Real Estate (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 5078, 1995); Ronel Elul, Nicholas S. Souleles, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Dennis 
Glennon & Robert Hunt, What “Triggers” Mortgage Default? (Research Dep't, Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 10-13, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596707. 
 66. National unemployment rates generally increased from around 4% in mid-2000 to 
around 6.3% in mid-2003 then generally decreased through mid-2007, when unemployment 
reached 4.6%. Unemployment rates increased through year-end 2009, then started to 
decrease. Unemployment reached 5% by the end of 2007, 7.4% by the end of 2008, 10% by 
the end of 2009, and then declined to 9.4% by the end of 2010. Timing varies somewhat by 
locality. See Civilian Unemployment Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/UNRATE.txt. 
 67. See, e.g., Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, Where’s the Smoking Gun? A Study 
of Underwriting Standards for U.S. Subprime Mortgages 10–14 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, Working Paper No. 2008-036E, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1286106 
(arguing that within the category of subprime mortgages, underwriting actually strengthened 
from 2004 to 2006 based on FICO scores, and that high defaults in 2004 and later vintages may 
be due to declining housing prices). Nationwide housing prices generally appreciated through 
mid-2006, then declined. Press Release, S&P Indices, Home Prices Continued to Decline in 
November 2011 According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (Jan. 31, 2012), 
available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-
indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff--p-us. As with unemployment, timing varies somewhat 
by locality. 
 68. See DEAN BAKER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE HOUSING BUBBLE FACT 
SHEET (2005), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/housing_fact_2005_07.pdf; 
Dean Baker, The Run-up in Home Prices: A Bubble, CHALLENGE, Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 93; Karl E. 
Case & Robert J. Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY, Vol. 2: 2003, at 299, available at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/eca/summary/v2003/2003.2case.html; Nouriel Roubini, Why Central 
Banks Should Burst Bubbles, 9 INT’L FIN. 87 (2006). Other experts argued there was no bubble. See 
Jonathan McCarthy & Richard W. Peach, Are Home Prices the Next “Bubble”?, 10 ECON. POL’Y 
REV., Dec. 2004, at 1, 10, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=634265; 
Suzanne Stewart & Ike Brannon, A Collapsing Housing Bubble?, REGULATION, Spring 2006, at 15, 
15–16, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/Sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=898196; Michael D. Bordo, 
U.S. Housing Price Boom-Busts in Historical Perspective 7 (Ind. State Univ. Networks Fin. Inst., 
Policy Brief 2005-PB-02, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=923865. 
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depended on optimistic projections of housing appreciation.69 The assumption of 
continued increases in housing prices in the face of a likely housing bubble was 
itself a relaxation of underwriting standards.70 
All three data sources—ex ante loan characteristics, contemporaneous surveys 
of knowledgeable experts, and ex post loan performance—are consistent with a 
dramatic deterioration in loan quality at origination for 2004 to 2007 vintages. 
This data raises an intriguing question: why did loan quality deteriorate so 
dramatically during these years? Many of the possible contributing causes that have 
been identified in the literature existed long before 2004 to 2007. Was some sort of 
tipping point suddenly reached? 
A casual glance at Figure 2 suggests that dramatic changes took place in the 
market during these years, as private securitizers gained market share while the 
GSEs and government agencies lost ground. Could this reversal in securitizer 
market share have led to changes in underwriting by originators? 
B. GSEs Historically Monitored and Disciplined Originators 
The GSEs historically controlled originators by establishing national standards 
for “conforming” loans as well as standardized documents, underwriting practices, 
loan products, and servicing arrangements.71 Centralization not only enhanced GSE 
control; it also increased efficiency and contributed to MBS market growth and 
liquidity.72 Notable efficiency gains included the use of automated underwriting 
based on objective, statistically validated criteria for predicting default risk.73 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. See Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, Subprime Mortgage Design 3 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2008-039E, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290716 (demonstrating that subprime contracts depended on 
prepayments and that the subprime boom was sustained by high and early prepayments 
during a period of house price appreciation); Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007 67 (Int’l Ctr. 
for Fin. at Yale Sch. of Mgmt. & Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 08-24, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1255362 (demonstrating that the design of 
subprime mortgage contracts depended on continued housing price appreciation). 
 70. See Bhardwaj & Sengupta, supra note 69, at 15–16 (acknowledging that the growth 
of the subprime market itself constitutes deterioration of underwriting standards in the 
overall U.S. mortgage market); Mian & Sufi, supra note 55, at 1467–71 (showing zip-code 
level increases in neighborhood debt-to-income ratios). 
 71. BELSKY & RICHARDSON, supra note 53, at 14, 17–19. 
 72. BELSKY & RICHARDSON, supra note 53, at 14; Richard K. Green & Ann B. Schnare, The 
Rise and Fall of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Lessons Learned and Options for Reform 
(Empiris, LLC, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1509722; INGRID GOULD ELLEN, 
JOHN NAPIER TYE & MARK A. WILLIS, NYU FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, 
IMPROVING U.S. HOUSING FINANCE THROUGH REFORM OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: 
ASSESSING THE OPTIONS 4–7 (2010), http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Improving_US_ 
Housing_Finance_Fannie_Mae_Freddie_Mac_9_8_10.pdf. 
 73. Automated underwriting replaced an expensive, subjective process with one that 
was faster, cheaper, and did not appear (at least initially) to produce results that were any 
worse. BELSKY & RICHARDSON, supra note 53, at 17–19; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE 
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT S–2 (2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf. See also 
Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Securitization and Moral Hazard: Evidence from a Lender 
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The GSEs also exercised control through contractually negotiated rights to sell 
back to originators loans that did not comply with GSE standards, that breached 
representations and warranties, and that subsequently became nonperforming.74 
Compared to private securitizers, the GSEs have been more aggressive in their use 
of such repurchase agreements,75 and more successful in enforcing their rights 
against originators.76 By bringing claims based on these repurchase agreements, the 
GSEs have already recovered from originators between 10% and 15% of their 
credit losses.77 
The GSEs’ large market share and therefore large buyer power may have helped 
them maintain tighter control over originators compared to other securitizers.78 
                                                                                                                 
Cutoff Rule 13–14 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Paper No. 09-5, 2009), available at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0905.pdf; Hollis Fishelson-Holstine, The 
Role of Credit Scoring in Increasing Homeownership for Underserved Populations 4, 16 
(Harvard Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud., Working Paper No. BABC 04-12, 2004), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/babc_04-12.pdf. See generally 
Susan Wharton Gates, Vanessa Gail Perry & Peter M. Zorn, Automated Underwriting in 
Mortgage Lending: Good News for the Underserved?, 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 369 
(2002). 
 74. When mortgage insurers rescind coverage, or a loan defaults, GSEs require 
indemnification against potential losses or that the loan be repurchased. Fannie Mae, Annual 
Report (Form 10-K) 167–172 (Feb. 26, 2010); see also JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K) 98 (Feb. 28, 2011); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 224 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]. 
 75. One of the largest originators, JP Morgan Chase & Co., reports that its repurchase 
agreements liability is ‘predominantly’ with the GSEs and that repurchase demands from 
“private-label securitizations have been limited.” JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report 
(Form 10-K) 98, 122 (Feb. 28, 2011). Similarly, Bank of America (which has acquired 
Countrywide, one of the largest originators), reports that non-GSE repurchase agreements 
have “less rigorous representations and warranties” and therefore present less risk to 
originators. BANK OF AM. CORP., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 59 (2011). Bank of America notes 
that GSEs can force repurchases of individual loans when those loans default and an 
investigation reveals that the loans did not meet GSE standards, whereas private 
securitization investors can generally only trigger a repurchase if misrepresentations are so 
severe that it “materially and adversely affects the interest of all investors.” Id. at 59, 187. 
 76. Bank of America’s 2010 annual report reveals that the GSEs have brought more claims, 
both in absolute terms and as a percentage of loans purchased, than private securitization 
investors, and the GSEs have been more successful in resolving those claims. See BANK OF AM. 
CORP., supra note 75, at 57–59. On $1.1 trillion in loan sales to the GSEs from 2004 to 2008, the 
GSEs brought $21.6 billion in claims, or approximately 2%. Of these claims, $18.2 billion, or 
over 80%, have been resolved, with Bank of America claiming net losses of 27%. On 963 billion 
in loan sales to private securitizations, investors and private mortgage insurers brought $13.7 
billion in claims, or less than 1.5%. Of these claims, $6 billion, or less than half, have been 
resolved. Recent news reports suggest that Bank of America may be settling more claims with 
private investors. See Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Nears Huge Settlement, WSJ.COM (June 29, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304447804576414222265248768.html. 
 77. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 224 (“[D]uring the three years and eight months 
ending August 31, 2010, Freddie and Fannie required sellers to repurchase 167,000 loans 
totaling $34.8 billion. So far, Freddie has received $9.1 billion from sellers, and Fannie has 
received $11.8 billion—a total of $20.9 billion. The amount put back is notable in that it 
represents 21% of $163 billion in credit-related expenses recorded by the GSEs since the 
beginning of 2008 through September 2010.”) The GSEs’ actual recovery of $20.9 billion is 
13% of $163 billion. 
 78. See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Securitization and Moral Hazard: Evidence from 
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Enforcing repurchase agreements requires sampling loans to identify those that are 
defective. In the mid-2000s, private securitizers in need of loans from originators 
reduced their loan sampling rates79 and waived in many noncompliant loans.80 
Originators also often “gamed” securitizers’ quality control systems, resubmitting 
previously rejected loans in new pools.81 Resubmissions would presumably be less 
likely to succeed if the securitization market was highly concentrated and a single 
securitizer was reviewing the same loan a second time. 
The GSEs’ most powerful tool for exercising control over originators may have 
been their centralized purchasing power. The GSEs can discipline originators by 
ending their relationship if the originator fails to comply with GSE underwriting 
standards or if there is an unusual increase in defaults of the originator’s loans.82 A 
decision by the GSEs to cut off funding for an originator by refusing to purchase 
that originator’s loans could have a devastating and almost immediate impact on 
the originator’s revenues and potential profits. The GSEs have in fact cut off a 
number of originators over the years, usually putting those originators out of 
business.83 Since the financial crisis caused private securitizers to exit the market 
and thereby enhanced GSE buyer power, the GSEs have become more aggressive 
with originators.84 
Standard setting by the GSEs is most influential if there are no alternatives. To 
the extent that non-GSE securitizers created alternative, competing channels for 
originators to sell their loans, they undermined the GSEs’ ability to control 
originators.85 In a competitive market for loans, any securitizer who attempted to 
                                                                                                                 
Credit Score Cutoff Rules, RES. REV., July–Dec. 2011, at 9 (“The ubiquity of . . . credit score cutoff 
rules in the mortgage markets is a testament to the ability of Fannie and Freddie to enforce their 
underwriting guidelines through software programs, contractual provisions, and monitoring. . . . 
[L]arge securitizers like Fannie and Freddie were to some extent able to regulate lenders’ screening 
behavior.”), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ResearchReview/issue16/issue16.pdf. 
 79. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 165. 
 80. See id. at 166. 
 81. Id. at 168. 
 82. Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 78, at 22; see also FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FAMILY 
MAE SINGLE FAMILY A2–3 (2011), available at 
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/sg/pdf/sel072611.pdf; FREDDIE MAC, SINGLE-FAMILY 
SELLER/SERVICER GUIDE 5.2 (2012), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/. 
 83. Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 73, at 22. Fannie Mae terminated New Century 
Financial Corporation in March of 2007, effectively putting them out of business. Jonathan 
Stempel, New Century Cut Off by Fannie Mae, Shut in Calif., REUTERS.COM (Mar. 20, 2007), 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN2037637320070320. Freddie Mac and Ginnie 
Mae suspended Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corporation in August of 2009, 
effectively putting them out of business. Adam Quinones, Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Shuts 
Down Lending Operations, MORTG. NEWS DAILY (Aug. 5, 2009, 1:47PM), 
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/08052009_tbw_shuts_down.asp.  
 84. Freddie Mac has begun to require larger sellers and servicers to agree to repurchase 
plans as well as financial penalties in the event of noncompliance with those plans. See Fed. 
Home Loan Mortg. Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10–Q) 45 (May 4, 2011). 
 85. Originators were able to survive GSE termination when they could find an alternate 
source of funding. Although Fannie Mae terminated its relationship with First Beneficial 
Mortgage Corporiation in the late 1990s after discovering fraud, First Beneficial was able to 
continue obtaining funding from Ginnie Mae for several years because Fannie Mae did not 
share its discovery with other secondary market players. Kenneth M. Donohue, Fraud, 
Mortgage-Backed Securities and Ginnie Mae, MORTGAGE BANKING, June 2008, at 80.  
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discipline originators would likely suffer a loss of market share to more lenient 
competitors.86 And compared to the GSEs, private securitizers were less capable of 
disciplining originators because each individual private securitizer was much 
smaller than the GSEs and therefore had less influence over large originators. 
C. Originators Consolidated and Diversified Away from Prime Mortgages 
Two developments in the origination market may have shifted the balance of 
power away from GSEs and toward originators. First, increasing concentration in 
the origination market may have enabled originators to counter GSE buyer power. 
Second, the growth of nonprime securitization gave originators an alternate option 
for funding and reduced their dependence on the GSEs. 
Although specific local markets experienced an increase in the number of 
originators in the 2000s, much of the local growth came from the entry of large 
national chains into local markets. At the national level, a few large originators 
accounted for an increasing share of originations. Thus, there was both increased 
competition between originators at the local level, where lenders competed for 
individual borrowers, and reduced competition between originators at the national 
level, where large national originators sold mortgages in bulk to securitizers. Figure 
7 below shows that mortgage origination has steadily become more concentrated at 
the national level. By 2004, the top ten players accounted for over 50% of 
originations, and climbing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 4, at 103, 111. 
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Figure 7: Mortgage origination became highly concentrated 
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Originators also diversified away from conventional/prime origination and 
toward nonprime origination. Nonprime lending did not simply grow because of 
growth at specialty nonprime originators; it grew in part because large, established 
prime originators entered the business of nonprime lending.87 As the top 
conventional/conforming mortgage originators diversified into nonprime mortgage 
originations, they became less dependent on the GSEs. 
D. Securitizers Competed for Market Share by Relaxing Standards 
Private bank securitizers’ willingness to relax their underwriting standards and 
securitize nonprime loans enabled them to dramatically increase market share and 
race ahead of the GSEs.88 Nonprime mortgages were funded primarily through the 
private (non-GSE) securitization market.89 Because nonprime mortgages were 
securitized at a very high rate, as shown in Figure 8, and were primarily securitized 
by private banks, nonprime mortgages constituted a disproportionately large share 
of private label MBS issuance, as shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Whereas nonprime mortgage origination had once been a niche specialty, large, 
mainstream mortgage originators increasingly shifted toward nonprime origination. In 1998, 
the top six subprime lenders were Household Financial Services, Associates First Capital, 
ContiMortgage Corporation, IMC Mortgage Company, The Money Store, and Green Tree 
Financial. 1 INSIDE MORTG. FIN., supra note 60, at 157. By 2007, the top six subprime 
mortgage originators included divisions of Citi, HSBC, Countrywide, Wells Fargo, Merrill 
Lynch, and Chase. See id. at 144. 
 88. See supra Figure 2 (showing a dramatic decline in GSE and FHA market share in 
2004 to 2007). 
 89. 2 INSIDE MORTG. FIN., supra note 60, at 3–6, 36. As discussed below, the GSEs 
purchased a significant quantity of the highest rated tranches of subprime and Alt-A private 
label MBS as portfolio investments. See infra note 197. As purchasers of select tranches of 
prepackaged MBS, the GSEs would likely have had far less control over individual loan 
selection than as purchasers and securitizers of individual whole loans. GSE MBS purchases, 
though substantial, were a minority of private label issuances. 
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Figure 8: By 2004 to 2007, nonprime mortgages were securitized at the 
same rate as conventional conforming mortgages 
 
Figure 9: Subprime and Alt-A loans accounted for most private label (non-
GSE) MBS issuance and volume growth from 2004 to 2007 
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E. Power Shifted from GSEs to Originators 
Figure 10 below shows an index of the relative buyer power of the GSEs and 
supplier power of the top conventional/conforming mortgage originators. Top 
conventional/conforming mortgage originators are defined as institutions that 
originated more than $400 billion in conventional/conforming mortgages from 
2000 to 2010. 
The fundamental assumption behind the index is that an originator who 
originates primarily conventional mortgages is more dependent on the GSEs to 
securitize and guarantee those mortgages than is an originator who has diversified 
and also originates subprime and Alt-A mortgages. Similarly, the index assumes 
that the GSEs are more dependent on conventional originators with larger market 
share because those originators are important suppliers of raw material.90 
These assumptions are consistent with widely used business strategy 
frameworks such as Porter’s Five Forces, which are based on the Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm in industrial organization economics. Porter 
posits that greater concentration and an absence of substitutes at one position in a 
production value chain confer greater market power on firms in that position, while 
greater concentration and market power of those firms’ suppliers reduces those 
firms’ bargaining power.91 
As can be seen from Figure 10, the GSEs’ power over the top conventional 
originators declined to relatively low levels in 2004 to 2007, the years in which the 
worst quality mortgages were originated.92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. See Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk 
Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 1327, 1366–71 (2009).  
 91. See Michael E. Porter, The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Jan. 2008, at 78–93; see also JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 
1968); Hans Degryse & Steven Ongena, Competition and Regulation in the Banking Sector: 
A Review of the Empirical Evidence on the Sources of Bank Rents, in HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND BANKING 483 (Anjan V. Thakor & W. A. Boot eds., 2007) 
(discussing the origins and developments in the SCP approach); Allen N. Berger, Asli 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Ross Levine & Joseph G. Haubrich, Bank Concentration and Competition: 
An Evolution in the Making, 36 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 433 (2003), available at 2004 
WLNR 22247923 (discussing developments in the SCP approach and alternative analyses). 
 92. For each originator, the index is the originator’s dependence on the GSEs—
measured by the originator’s annual conventional mortgage originations as a share of the 
originator’s annual overall mortgage originations—divided by the GSEs’ dependence on the 
mortgage originator—measured by the originator’s annual conventional mortgage 
originations as a share of all annual conventional mortgage originations by all originators. 
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Figure 10: The GSEs’ buyer power relative to large originators’ supplier 
power reached very low levels in 2004 to 2008 
 
A new private market leader did not emerge to replace the GSEs and discipline 
originators. Although the private banks collectively captured more market share 
than the GSEs, no individual institution matched the GSEs’ previous level of 
market dominance.93 In other words, as the GSEs lost market share, the secondary 
market became fragmented. Competitive, fragmented securitizers faced 
increasingly consolidated originators,94 and power shifted from securitizers to 
originators. Without a clear securitization market leader capable of enforcing 
standards and penalizing noncompliant originators, discipline broke down.95 
One of the most impressive studies linking local level competition between 
originators to deteriorating mortgage underwriting standards in the years leading up 
to the mortgage crisis was conducted by three economists at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven.96 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. See 2 INSIDE MORTG. FIN., supra note 60, at 9, 35–50. 
 94. See supra Figure 7 (showing increasing consolidation among mortgage originators). 
 95. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger & Susan Block-Lieb, Consumer Credit and Competition: 
The Puzzle of Competitive Credit Markets, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 68 (2010) (arguing that 
competition in the securitization market for loans diminished the standardizing force of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). See generally Erik F. Gerding, Deregulation Pas de Deux: 
Dual Regulatory Classes of Financial Institutions and the Path to Financial Crisis in 
Sweden and the United States (Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Paper No. 2010-04, 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548753 (linking competition from the private 
sector to a loosening of underwriting standards). 
 96. See generally Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, Credit Booms and 
Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market (Eur. Banking Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 2009–14S, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1100138. 
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Using data from 2000 to 2006 including over 50 million individual mortgage 
applications across 387 Metropolitan Statistical Areas,97 and controlling for local 
and national economic variables,98 the authors found that incumbents’ lending 
standards99 declined after new competitors entered local markets.100 The authors 
argue that local lenders felt compelled to cut their underwriting standards to 
compete effectively with the new entrants.101 
The authors’ findings are consistent with the hypothesis that underwriting 
standards tend to be lower in fragmented markets where competition is more 
intense than in concentrated markets where competition is generally more 
restrained. Specifically, the authors found that subprime underwriting standards 
declined more in areas with a larger number of lenders and more new entrants.102 
The authors also found substantial differences between the drivers of lending 
standards in prime and subprime mortgage markets: the effect of competition in 
driving down underwriting standards was largely limited to subprime mortgage 
markets.103 Whereas subprime lenders became less cautious as the number of 
applications increased, prime lenders became more cautious.104 
One possible explanation for differences in the prime and subprime markets is 
that the GSEs—who remained major loan purchasers in the prime market but 
played a minor role in the subprime market105—helped maintain higher 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. See id. at 1, 9. 
 98. Id. at 1. The authors controlled for variables that might affect mortgage application 
denials, including average income, income growth, the unemployment rate, the self-
employment rate, and house price appreciation to take into account the role of collateral. Id. 
at 9−10. They also controlled for securitization rates. Id. at 5. 
 99. The authors used two measures of lending standards: denials as a percent of loan 
applications and loan-to-income ratios. Id. at 1, 9. 
 100. Id. at 2, 21. 
 101. Id. at 2. 
 102. Id. at 2 (“Denial rates declined more in areas with a larger number of competitors.”); 
id. at 18 (“A one standard deviation increase in the number of competitors reduces MSA-
level subprime denial rates by 3 percentage points . . . .”); id. at 21; id. at 25 (“The effect of 
competition is also confirmed with higher LTI [loan-to-income] ratios in MSAs with larger 
number of competing lenders.”). 
 103. Id. at 16 (“In the subprime mortgage market, denial rates were lower in more 
competitive markets as measured by the number of competitors in the MSA. This coefficient 
was, instead, not statistically significant for the prime market.”); id. at 21; id. at 27 (“[T]he 
effects we identify for the subprime market are either much weaker or absent in the prime 
mortgage market, lending additional support that the deterioration in lending standards was 
more pronounced in the subprime mortgage market. Our evidence suggests that while in the 
prime market lending standards were largely determined by underlying fundamentals, for 
subprime loans lending market conditions and strategic interactions played an important role 
in lending decisions.”). 
 104. Id. at 1, 15. 
 105. Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven define the subprime market as consisting of loans 
originated by lenders listed as subprime lenders by the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD). Id. at 6. This is the same definition of the subprime market used 
by the GSEs themselves in classifying the overwhelming majority of their loans as prime. 
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 451 n.5 (2011) (dissenting statement of Peter J. 
Wallison). 
242 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:213 
 
underwriting standards by exercising greater control over the originators who 
supplied them with loans. 
F. GSE Underwriting Remained More Conservative than Average 
High market share and a high degree of centralized control over underwriting 
appear to be associated with more conservative underwriting. Both underlying loan 
performance data and financial market prices for packaged securities suggest that 
the GSEs maintained higher underwriting standards than most other secondary 
market actors.106 
Loan performance data compiled by Freddie Mac’s Office of the Chief 
Economist107 suggest that the GSEs were in fact more successful than almost any 
other secondary market actor in maintaining high standards in the individual loans 
that they purchased. The data also suggest that the FHA and VA—though not as 
successful as the GSEs—were more successful than the average private label 
securitizers and also more successful than banks and thrifts that retained loans in 
their portfolios. 
The data are current as of December 31, 2010, and were compiled by Freddie 
Mac from sources including the Mortgage Bankers Association National 
Delinquency Survey, Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Data, FHA and VA 
monthly reports, Freddie Mac’s most recent annual 10-K report, Fannie Mae’s 
Fourth-Quarter 2010 Credit Supplement, Core Logic LoanPerformance data, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the NCUA. Data is presented 
in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. See, e.g., IMMERGLUCK, supra note 4, at 211. 
 107. Although Freddie Mac is an interested party, the credibility of its data is bolstered 
by its consistency with financial market assessments of relative losses and analyses 
conducted by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. It is also consistent with data 
compiled by the GSEs’ regulator. FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, FORECLOSURE PREVENTION & 
REFINANCE REPORT THIRD QUARTER 2011, at 4 (2011); FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, DATA 
ON THE RISK CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SINGLE FAMILY MORTGAGES 
ORIGINATED FROM 2001 THROUGH 2008 AND FINANCED IN THE SECONDARY MARKET 27 
(2010). 
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Figure 11: GSEs loan performance was better than private securitizers and 
even traditional depository institutions  
 
 
The implication of Freddie Mac’s data—that the GSEs were better at quality 
control than other entities—is broadly consistent with a detailed analysis of loan 
performance conducted by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC). In 
May of 2009, Congress appointed the FCIC to investigate the causes of the 
financial crisis of 2008.108 
The FCIC analyzed over twenty-five million mortgages, some of which were 
purchased or guaranteed by the GSEs, some of which were insured by the FHA or 
VA, and the remainder of which were Alt-A or subprime mortgages securitized in 
the private market.109 
The FCIC found that: 
The data illustrate that in 2008 and 2009, GSE loans performed 
significantly better than privately securitized, or non-GSE, subprime 
and Alt-A loans. . . . In 2008, the respective average delinquency rates 
for the non-GSE and GSE loans were 28.3% and 6.2%.110 
Like Freddie Mac, the FCIC found that FHA and VA loans performed much better 
than private label Alt-A and subprime loans, but not as well as GSE loans.111 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at xi. 
 109. Id. at 216. 
 110. Id. at 218−19. 
 111. Id. at 218 fig.11.3. 
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The GSEs’ superior performance relative to private label mortgages persists 
even when controlling for risk factors such as low-borrower FICO scores112 or high 
loan-to-value ratios.113 The FCIC attributed the GSEs’ performance advantage to 
“differences in underwriting standards” and to less “risk layering” by the GSEs.114 
In other words, the GSEs were less likely to combine low FICO scores with high 
loan-to-value ratios in the same loan. 
The FCIC’s findings undercut claims by Edward Pinto, a mortgage market 
consultant who has frequently testified before Congress that the GSEs funded the 
riskiest mortgages.115 
The GSEs’ superior performance may be due in part to their size and market 
power, in part to good incentives created by GSE retention of default risk, and 
perhaps also in part to regulations which limited the GSEs’ ability to relax their 
underwriting standards. 
G. Experts Believe that Competition Contributed to Loose Underwriting 
Expert opinions that certain kinds of competition can undermine underwriting 
standards lend additional support to the quantitative empirical evidence presented 
above.  
One of the major themes of the FCIC’s report is that competitive pressures led 
to greater risk taking and poor mortgage underwriting. The report identifies 
competition for market share, revenue, and profits between the GSEs116 and the 
private banks117 that purchased and securitized mortgages, and similar competition 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. Id. at 218 (“[A]mong loans to borrowers with FICO scores below 660, a privately 
securitized mortgage was more than four times as likely to be seriously delinquent as a 
GSE.”). 
 113. Id. at 219 (“[I]n 2008 among loans with an LTV above 90%, the GSE pools have an 
average rate of serious delinquency of 5.7%, versus a rate of 15.5% for loans in private Alt-
A securities.”). 
 114. Id.; see also Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's Key Role in Subprime Lending: 
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 3−4 (2008) 
(statement of Edward J. Pinto), available at http://oversight-
archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20081209145847.pdf (suggesting that many 
“subprime” loans by loan-to-value ratio or by FICO score were mislabeled as “prime” in 
many databases). 
 115. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 218−19 (summarizing Pinto’s claims and rejecting his 
analysis as “misleading”); see also DAVID MIN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FAULTY CONCLUSIONS 
BASED ON SHODDY FOUNDATIONS (2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/pinto.pdf; infra Part VI. 
 116. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at xix, 18; id. at 122 (“In 2004, Fannie and 
Freddie . . . were losing market share to Wall Street . . . . Struggling to remain dominant, 
they loosened their underwriting standards, purchasing and guaranteeing riskier loans, and 
increasing their securities purchases.”); see also id. at 178–82 (discussing the debate among 
managers of the GSEs in 2004 about whether to loosen underwriting standards to preserve 
market share and profitability, and the ultimate decision to do so); id. at 318 (noting that the 
GSEs’ regulator blamed the GSEs for underpricing risk in order to gain market share and 
compete with Wall Street banks).  
 117. Id. at 88 (noting that investment banks began to compete for supplies of subprime 
loans to feed their securitization machinery); id. at 166 (“Keith Johnson, the president of [a 
large third-party loan due diligence firm that worked for private securitizers], told the 
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between mortgage originators118 as causes of risky lending that led to the crisis. The 
report also describes competition between financial regulators, which reduced those 
regulators’ authority.119 The report also describes how competition between credit 
rating agencies for market share and profits reduced the rating agencies’ ability to 
honestly and diligently evaluate the collateral underlying MBS.120 Like the majority 
                                                                                                                 
Commission . . . . that his clients often waived in loans [that did not meet their own 
underwriting criteria] to preserve their business relationship with the loan originator—a high 
number of rejections might lead the originator to sell the loans to a competitor. Simply put, it 
was a sellers’ market. ‘Probably the seller had more power than the Wall Street issuer,’ 
Johnson told the FCIC.”); see also ELLEN ET AL., supra note 72, at 4 (“As a result of this new 
and aggressive competition from the PLS market, the GSEs saw their market share erode. In 
response, the GSEs loosened their underwriting guidelines . . . .”). 
 118. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 20 (“‘Poison’ was the word famously used by 
Countrywide’s [CEO Angelo] Mozilo to describe one of the loan products his firm was 
originating. . . . Others at the bank argued in response that they were offering products 
‘pervasively offered in the marketplace by virtually every relevant competitor of ours.’”); id. 
at 79 (noting that, according to FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, “‘really poorly underwritten 
loans’” originated outside the traditional banking sector, “pulled market share from 
traditional banks,” and “‘created negative competitive pressure for the banks and thrifts to 
start following suit’”); id. at 105 (“In 2004, Mozilo announced a very aggressive goal of 
gaining ‘market dominance’ . . . . But Countrywide was not unique: Ameriquest, New 
Century, Washington Mutual, and others all pursued loans as aggressively. They competed 
by originating types of mortgages created years before as niche products, but now 
transformed into riskier, mass-market versions.”); id. at 108 (“Mentioning . . . competitors, 
John Stumpf, the CEO, chairman, and president of Wells Fargo, recalled Wells’s decision 
not to write option ARMs . . . . These were ‘hard decisions to make at the time,’ he said, 
noting ‘we did lose revenue, and we did lose volume.’”). 
 119. Id. at xviii (“[T]he government permitted financial firms to pick their preferred 
regulators in what became a race to the weakest supervisor.”); id. at 94–95 (“Greenspan and 
other [Federal Reserve] officials were concerned that routinely examining the nonbank 
subsidiaries could create an uneven playing field because the subsidiaries had to compete 
with the independent mortgage companies, over which the Fed had no supervisory authority 
. . . .”); id. at 154 (“[According to] Mark Olson, a Fed governor from 2001 to 2006[,] ‘There 
was a lot of competitiveness among the regulators.’ In January 2008, Fed staff had prepared 
an internal study to find out why none of the investment banks had chosen the Fed as its 
consolidated supervisor. . . . [T]he biggest reason firms opted not to be supervised by the Fed 
was the ‘comprehensiveness’ of the Fed’s supervisory approach, ‘particularly when 
compared to alternatives such as Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) or Securities & 
Exchange Commission (SEC) holding company supervision.’”); id. at 306 (“In an August 
2008 interview, William Isaac, who was chairman of the FDIC from 1981 until 1985, noted 
that the OTS and FDIC had competing interests. . . . FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair 
underscored this tension, telling the FCIC that ‘our examiners, much earlier, were very 
concerned about the underwriting quality of WaMu’s mortgage portfolio, and we were 
actively opposed by the OTS in terms of going in and letting our [FDIC] examiners do loan-
level analysis.’”) (alteration in original). 
 120. Id. at xxv (“[T]he forces at work behind the breakdown at Moody’s [Investor 
Service, one of the three major rating agencies, included] . . . pressure from financial firms 
that paid for the ratings, the relentless drive for market share, [and] the lack of resources to 
do the job despite record profits . . . .”); id. at 206–12; id. at 210 (“[T]he pressure for market 
share, combined with complacency, may have deterred Moody’s from creating new models 
or updating its assumptions . . . .”); id. (“Richard Michalek, a former Moody’s vice president 
and senior credit officer, testified to the FCIC, ‘The threat of losing business to a competitor, 
even if not realized, absolutely tilted the balance away from an independent arbiter of risk 
towards a captive facilitator of risk transfer.’ [Gary] Witt [, a former Managing Director at 
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report, the FCIC dissenting report by Peter J. Wallison identifies competition for 
loans as a cause of poor underwriting, although the dissent claims that the 
competition for loans was driven by government affordable housing policies rather 
than the pursuit of revenue, market share, and profit.121 
III. CONCENTRATED MARKET STRUCTURES WORK WELL IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
Additional evidence that concentrated mortgage securitization markets tend to 
be more stable than fragmented, competitive ones can be found in foreign mortgage 
markets. Advocates of U.S. mortgage market reform have noted mortgage market 
stability and high home ownership rates in select western European countries that 
use covered bonds.122 The European model shares many features with the U.S. GSE 
model—both models involve large financial institutions, which select and back 
mortgages, which have implied guarantees from their respective governments, and 
whose ability to relax underwriting standards is limited by regulation.123 However, 
unlike the U.S. GSEs, European institutions did not face competition from more 
lightly regulated private label securitizers.124 The covered bond model might not be 
workable in a competitive, lightly regulated market. In the United States, different 
variations of this model have been tried but have failed.125 
European covered bonds are similar to all securitization in that investors have 
first priority claims on a particular set of loans. European covered bonds are similar 
to GSE securitizations—and different from most U.S. private label 
securitizations—in that investors have recourse not only to the loans backing the 
                                                                                                                 
Moody’s,] agreed. When asked if the investment banks frequently threatened to withdraw 
their business if they didn’t get their desired rating, Witt replied, ‘Oh God, are you kidding? 
All the time. I mean, that’s routine. I mean, they would threaten you all of the time. . . . It’s 
like, “Well, next time, we’re just going to go with Fitch and S&P.” [Moody’s President 
Brian] Clarkson affirmed that ‘it wouldn’t surprise me to hear people say that’ about issuer 
pressure on Moody’s employees.”) (alterations in original); id. at 210–11 (quoting an 
internal memorandum from October 2007, in which Moody’s Chief Credit Officer Andrew 
Kimball warned that investment banks that issued MBS were “penaliz[ing] quality by 
awarding rating mandates based on the lowest credit enhancement needed for the highest 
rating. Unchecked, competition on this basis can place the entire financial system at risk.”). 
 121. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 444, 453–55, 464, 481, 487, 490, 506, 509, 511, 
519 (dissenting statement of Peter J. Wallison).  
 122. Dwight M. Jaffee, Reforming the U.S. Mortgage Market Through Private Market 
Incentives 11–24 (Fisher Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Econ., Working Paper, 2011), 
available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4x0357n0. 
 123. The primary difference is off-balance-sheet accounting treatment for securitizations 
versus on-balance-sheet accounting treatment for covered bonds. Michael Lea, Paper Prepared 
for Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies National Symposium: Alternative Forms of 
Mortgage Finance: What Can We Learn from Other Countries? (Feb. 18, 2010), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.172.5652&rep=rep1&type=pdf.  
On-balance-sheet accounting treatment might improve regulators’ and investors’ ability to 
understand and limit financial institution leverage levels. See generally Simkovic, Secret Liens, 
supra note 3. 
 124. Lea, supra note 123, at 21 (“By legislation covered bond issuers must be regulated 
banks . . . .”). 
 125. Snowden, Mortgage, supra note 14, at 9–12, 30–32. 
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covered bonds or MBS but also to a guarantee from the issuing financial 
institution.126 
The most stable foreign markets were characterized by high market 
concentration and strict, uniform regulation. Within the best performing foreign 
countries, a few large, vertically integrated financial institutions dominated 
mortgage underwriting127 and therefore either had implicit government 
guarantees,128 or the largest mortgage lenders were state owned.129 In many of the 
best performing foreign markets, a single, powerful regulator supervised all 
financial institutions that originated, underwrote, and guaranteed mortgages.130 
Within the best performing countries, individual financial institutions had less 
flexibility than in the United States to “innovate” by relaxing their underwriting 
standards.131 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. Jaffee, supra note 122, at 18. 
 127. Lea, supra note 123, at 7 (“Mortgage lending tends to be dominated by banks and 
highly concentrated in most countries. The top five lenders have more than a 50 percent 
market share in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands and the UK.”); id. at 18 (“The 
[mortgage credit institutions (MCI)] in Denmark specialize in residential, commercial and 
agricultural mortgage lending. The market is highly concentrated with 4 MCI providing over 
80 percent of the market.”); id. at 26 (“[M]ortgage lending in most markets is dominated by 
large commercial banks. There is some evidence . . . that large lenders avoided the excesses 
of non-conforming lending due to concerns about reputation risk.”). 
 128. Id. at 21 (“Irish, German and Belgian governments had to step in and rescue covered 
bond issuers . . . . The European covered bond markets were stressed during the crisis. 
Issuance of jumbo covered bonds . . . . was only restarted in the first quarter of 2009 after the 
European Central Bank (ECB) announced a purchase program of up to € 65 billion. [There 
were also] widespread government guarantees of bank debt . . . in most countries during the 
crisis.”); INT’L MONETARY FUND, DENMARK—2010 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION, 
CONCLUDING STATEMENT OF THE MISSION (2010) (“The [Danish] banking system was 
fortified by a wide range of measures, including a blanket government guarantee for 
depositors and creditors; liquidity support; capital injections; and a temporary bank 
resolution scheme.”). 
 129. Lea, supra note 123, at 7 (“Banks are the largest lender class in Germany and Spain 
but the individual institution market shares is much smaller. Savings banks (owned by the 
state governments) are the largest lenders in these countries . . . .”). 
 130. Id. at 13 (“The US is unique in its fragmented regulatory structure with numerous 
specialized regulatory agencies. . . . An advantage to having a single financial sector 
regulator is the lower likelihood of regulatory capture or regulatory arbitrage . . . .”); id. at 25 
(“The Canadian financial regulatory structure is widely credited with enhancing the stability 
of the system. The IMF commended the Canadians on their highly effective and nearly 
unified regulatory and supervisory framework.”); id. at 26 (“[T]he decline in underwriting 
standards inherent in sub-prime lending was responsible for . . . the financial crisis. No other 
country experienced a similar decline in standards. . . . [N]one created a market with as poor 
quality loans as the US. . . . [N]o other country had as significant a shadow banking system 
as the US. In all other countries there was greater regulatory oversight of mortgage lending 
which may have slowed the move to lower standards. Having one financial regulator with 
responsibility for non-bank as well as bank lenders is an important attribute of regulation.”). 
 131. Id. at 18 (“The underwriting of Danish mortgages is more strict [than] that of the 
US. The maximum LTV is 80 percent and borrower income is fully documented. . . . The 
Danish system has performed well throughout the crisis. Despite having a larger house price 
bubble . . . the Danish system has had far fewer defaults . . . and foreclosures . . . .”); id. at 24 
(“Canada is unique in requiring mortgage insurance on all bank originated mortgages with 
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However, it remains unclear how much insight can be gained by comparing 
foreign mortgage markets to those in the United States because of broad economic, 
legal, and political differences. 
There are large differences between western Europe and the United States that 
may explain lower default rates in western Europe, including: more extensive 
social welfare systems, which stabilize household income;132 stronger labor 
protections, which may reduce the risk of sudden unemployment;133 much higher 
household savings rates134 and lower household debt levels;135 more robust transit 
networks, which reduce economic vulnerability to oil price shocks;136 a more 
punitive approach to financial institution bailouts;137 and more creditor-friendly 
insolvency and debt collection laws that shift the risk of loose underwriting away 
from creditors and toward debtors.138 
                                                                                                                 
LTV >80 percent. . . . The maximum LTV is 95 percent . . . .”); id. at 27 (“[R]equiring 
lenders to explicitly consider borrower affordability as is the case in many other countries 
would have reduced the prevalence of stated income loans and teaser ARMs.”). 
 132. The United States does less than any developed country, except South Korea, to reduce 
income inequality through its taxation and transfer spending system, and spends relatively little 
on unemployment and family benefits. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Growing 
Unequal?: Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries, Country Note: United States 
(2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/social/socialpoliciesanddata/41528678.pdf; see also 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 128 (“Domestic demand was buttressed by large automatic 
stabilizers . . . .”). 
 133. Unionization rates in the United States (around 12%) are much lower than 
unionization rates in Canada and most of Western Europe. Jelle Visser, Union Membership 
Statistics in 24 Countries, MONTHLY LAB. REV., JAN. 2006. Although the United States has 
historically had relatively low unemployment, unemployment more than doubled between 
2007 and 2009, while western European and Canadian unemployment remained relatively 
stable. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INTERNATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND 
EMPLOYMENT INDEXES, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED, 2007-2011, at tbl.1, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/fls/intl_unemployment_rates_monthly.pdf; see also INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, supra note 128 (“Extended active labor market policies helped contain employment 
losses, while relatively generous unemployment benefits lessened the social impact.”). 
 134. ROSS HARVEY, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPARISON OF 
HOUSEHOLD SAVING RATIOS: EURO AREA/UNITED STATES/JAPAN (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/48/32023442.pdf. 
 135. EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, supra note 54, at 72–73 (“[H]ouseholds in the euro area 
display a lower average level of indebtedness. Crucially, the percentage of households with 
mortgage debt in the lowest quantiles of the income distribution is relatively small . . . .”). 
 136. Oil Prices and the Economic Downturn: Testimony Prepared for the J. Econ. Comm. 
of the U.S. Cong., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of James D. Hamilton) (arguing that an oil 
price spike in 2007 was an important cause of the recession); ANNE KORIN & DERON LOVAAS, 
TAKING THE WHEEL: ACHIEVING A COMPETITIVE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR THROUGH MOBILITY 
CHOICE (2010), available at http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/b4960fab-
a604-4e2d-a3a8-96004a067fcc.pdf (discussing the United States’ limited transit options and 
therefore high dependence on oil). 
 137. Thomas Ferguson & Robert Johnson, When Wolves Cry “Wolf”: Systemic Financial 
Crises and the Myth of the Danaid Jar, Paper Presented at INET Inaugural Conference at King’s 
College (Apr. 2010), available at http://ineteconomics.org/sites/inet.civicactions.net/files/INET% 
20C@K%20Paper%20Session%208%20-%20Ferguson%20(Rob%20Johnson)_0.pdf. 
 138. Jaffee, supra note 122, at 14, 20–21. More creditor-friendly laws are by no means a 
panacea. See, e.g., Quinn Curtis, Foreclosure Law and Mortgage Risk in the Subprime Era: 
An Empirical Examination (Jan. 4, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (reporting looser 
underwriting in states with more creditor-friendly foreclosure laws). Greater awareness of 
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IV. MORTGAGE MARKET PRIVATIZATION INCREASES RISKS TO TAXPAYERS 
The Treasury appears to be concerned about the extent to which the federal 
government’s balance sheet is being used to directly fund the mortgage market. The 
Treasury recently published a report to Congress, Reforming America’s Housing 
Finance Market (“Treasury Report”), which outlines a plan to “reduce the role of 
[Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] in the mortgage market and, ultimately, wind down 
both institutions.”139 The plan calls for restoring market competition by making 
“private markets . . . the primary source of mortgage credit” and by acting “to 
eliminate unfair capital, oversight, and accounting advantages and promote a level 
playing field” for private financial institutions to compete with one another.140 
The Treasury’s motivation appears to be at least partly ideological. The 
Treasury has decided that its ultimate goal is to reduce the role of government: 
There will of course be significant debate . . . . But we must be careful 
not to let that debate keep us from the immediate task at hand: we need 
to scale back the role of government in the mortgage market, and 
promote the return of private capital . . . . The housing finance system 
must be reformed.141 
The Treasury has emphasized the importance of the government reducing its 
market share so that private financial institutions can expand and make greater 
profits.142 According to the Treasury, “[u]nder normal market conditions, the 
essential components of housing finance—. . . lending money, determining how 
                                                                                                                 
the background legal regime among creditors than among borrowers may help explain why 
creditor-friendly collection laws appear to transfer value from borrowers to creditors without 
reducing borrowing costs. See Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and 
Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from US States, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3139 (2011); 
Michael Simkovic, The Effect BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and Prices, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 1 (2009) (finding that creditor-friendly changes to U.S. bankruptcy laws reduced 
loan losses to credit-card companies but did not reduce costs for credit-card borrowers). 
Streamlined foreclosure processes and large numbers of foreclosures can also depress 
housing prices and trigger more defaults. EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, supra note 54, at 72–73.  
 139. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., REFORMING 
AMERICA’S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2011) [hereinafter 
TREASURY REPORT], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Reforming%20 
America's%20Housing%20Finance%20Market.pdf. 
 140. Id. at 1. 
 141. Id. at 31 (emphasis in original). 
 142. Id. at 12–13 (“We support ending the unfair capital advantages that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac previously enjoyed and recommend FHFA require that they price their 
guarantees as if they were . . . private banks or financial institutions. This will . . . help the 
private market compete on a level playing field, reducing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
market share over time.”); id. at 13 (“In order to further scale back the [GSEs’] share of the 
mortgage market, the Administration recommends that Congress allow the temporary 
increase in limits [on the size of mortgages the GSEs are allowed to purchase and securitize] 
to expire . . . . As a result of these reforms, larger loans for more expensive homes will once 
again be funded only through the private market.”); id. at 14 (“As Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac’s presence in the market shrinks . . . . we will coordinate reforms . . . to help ensure the 
private market, not FHA, fills the market opportunities created by reform.”). 
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best to invest capital, and bearing credit risk—are fundamentally private sector 
activities.”143 
These statements reflect a normative preference that the government play a 
limited role in mortgage finance.144 However, the claim that mortgage finance 
consists of “fundamentally private sector activities” is hardly an accurate 
description of how mortgage finance has functioned in the United States for the last 
seventy years.145 
The Treasury has suggested that winding down the GSEs and reducing the 
government’s role in the mortgage market would protect taxpayers.146 Contrary to 
the Treasury’s claims, the analysis presented here suggests that residential 
mortgage market privatization along the lines envisioned by the Treasury would put 
taxpayers at greater risk. 
A. Private Competition Leads to More Failures and “Bailouts” 
As discussed above, a fragmented, competitive, privatized mortgage market 
leads financial institutions to take greater risks and makes financial crises more 
likely. The government cannot credibly commit in advance to refrain from bailing 
out financial institutions during the next crisis. 
In 2008 the federal government “bailed out” GSEs (which had been private for 
almost forty years) and many other large private financial institutions147—or to be 
more precise, those institutions’ creditors and shareholders. 
Under non-bailout insolvency resolution mechanisms such as bankruptcy, 
shareholders are wiped out and many creditors incur losses, but the institution itself 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. Id. at 12. 
 144. The Treasury’s view is not that the government should play no role whatsoever. The 
Treasury has suggested that the government should remain active as a regulator protecting 
borrowers and investors, possibly to provide “targeted” subsidies to low-income borrowers 
and possibly as a lender of last resort in times of crisis. Id. at 1, 27–30. However, in the 
Treasury’s view, government generally should not provide funding in the ordinary course, as 
the GSEs do now. 
 145. See supra Part II. 
 146. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 139, at 25–26, 31. 
 147. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 
1043–46 (2009) (arguing that large banks and finance firms were the epicenter of the 
financial crisis). The most salient bailouts were of Citigroup, Bear Stearns, AIG, the GSEs, 
and many investment and commercial banks through the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP). However, there were also less transparent mechanisms used to assist many more 
financial institutions, such as paying AIG’s CDS counterparties one hundred cents on the 
dollar rather than negotiating haircuts, allowing Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to 
convert to bank holding companies and borrow from the Federal Reserve, extensive 
purchases of commercial paper and discount lending by the Federal Reserve, debt and asset 
guarantees, and relaxation of mark-to-market accounting. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 
MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT 16–45 (2011) (discussing the many government interventions in 
response to the financial crisis); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 
437 (2011) (discussing the lack of transparency in the government’s response to the financial 
crisis); Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1729–62 (2011) 
(discussing the many regulatory exemptions granted in the wake of the financial crisis). 
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may be reorganized and continue to function if it can obtain postpetition financing. 
A number of bankruptcy scholars have argued that bailouts often relate less to the 
future operation of an institution—liquidation vs. reorganization—than to who will 
incur losses that have already been realized.148 To the extent that this is true, 
bailouts may be driven by political considerations rather than economic necessity. 
Whether bailouts are driven by politics or true economic necessity, they 
generally function as a mechanism for transferring losses from private investors 
and other creditors to taxpayers. 
The 2008 mortgage crisis was not the first time the U.S. government (or the 
Federal Reserve) “bailed out” private financial institutions. Other notable bailouts 
have included: elite financial institutions in the late 1920s and early 1930s after the 
Great Crash,149 Franklin National Bank in 1974, Continental Illinois National Bank 
and Trust Company in 1984, and most of the savings and loan industry and their 
exhausted insurance fund in 1989.150 Furthermore, the United States is not unique 
in its proclivity for bailouts: since World War II many other governments have 
bailed out their financial sectors.151 
Financial markets expect that the U.S. government will continue to bail out 
large, private financial institutions on favorable terms. Because these institutions 
enjoy an implied government guarantee, investors are willing to lend them money 
at lower rates than their smaller competitors.152 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. 
CORP. L. 469, 476–83, 498 (2010) (arguing that bankruptcy can be an effective resolution 
mechanism for financial institutions and is at times preferable to bailouts); Levitin, supra 
note 147, at 440 (arguing that bailouts are orchestrated to reduce the impact of a firm’s 
failure on its creditors); Stephen J. Lubben, Systemic Risk and Chapter 11, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 
433, 442–47 (2009) (arguing that Chapter 11 Bankruptcy could function as an effective 
resolution mechanism for financial institutions if exceptions for derivatives were scaled 
back). 
 149. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND 
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 30 (2010). 
 150. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 148, at 497–98 (arguing that regulators “invariably” 
bail out systemically important banks); Levitin, supra note 147, at 448 (discussing the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s decision to modify requirements for the Savings and Loan 
industry in 1982); Michael M. Phillips, The Financial Crisis: Government Bailouts - A U.S. 
Tradition Dating to Hamilton, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2008, at A3; Jesse Nankin, Eric 
Umansky, Krista Kjellman & Scott Klein, History of U.S. Gov’t Bailouts, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 
15, 2009), http://www.propublica.org/special/government-bailouts; Nelson D. Schwartz, A 
History of Public Aid During Crises, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at A27. 
 151. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 163–64, 166, 171 (2009). 
 152. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 149, at 12; Edward J. Kane, Extracting 
Nontransparent Safety Net Subsidies by Strategically Expanding and Contracting a 
Financial Institution’s Accounting Balance Sheet, 36 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 161 (2009); 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-To-Fail 
Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L., 707, 742–43 (2010) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Too-Big-To-
Fail]; Wilmarth, supra note 147, at 1049–50; Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph Warburton, The 
End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees (Working 
Paper, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656; Emilios Avgouleas, The 
Reform of ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ Bank: A New Regulatory Model for the Institutional Separation 
of ‘Casino’ from ‘Utility’ Banking 5–6 (Working Paper, 2010), available at 
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For these reasons and many others, few scholars believe that the government can 
credibly forswear bailing out private financial institutions in the event of a future 
financial crisis.153 And most scholars believe that another financial crisis is 
inevitable, notwithstanding recent financial reforms.154 
In the event of a crisis, the absence of a government-controlled alternative to 
private financial institutions would make government bailouts of systemically 
important financial institutions even more likely, and perhaps inevitable.155 
While a great deal of attention has been paid to the problem of “Too Big to Fail” 
institutions, traditional banking regulation and FDIC deposit insurance essentially 
assumes that every banking institution is too big to fail—that is, important creditors 
of even small mortgage lending institutions must be shielded from losses to prevent 
bank runs and contagion. The problem, therefore, may not be one of minimizing 
institutional size but rather one of maximizing systemic stability. 
B. Lender-of-Last-Resort Programs Transfer Cyclical Losses to Taxpayers 
Mortgage default risk is highly cyclical.156 During times of general distress, all 
loans, not just “risky” loans, become much more likely to default. During boom 
                                                                                                                 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552970; Santiago Carbo-Valverde, Edward J. Kane & Francisco 
Rodriguez-Fernandez, Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-To-Fail-and-Unwind 
Banks in the US and EU Before and During the Great Recession (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 16787, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759859; 
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Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON 
REG. 151, 155 (2011); Edward J. Kane, Missing Elements in US Financial Reform: A 
Kübler-Ross Interpretation of the Inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 
654 (2012); Levitin, supra note 147, at 483–84; Omarova, supra note 147, at 1760–69; Mark 
J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 539, 585–87 (2011); Michael Simkovic, Paving the Way for the Next 
Financial Crisis, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., March 2010, at 1, 5; Arthur E. 
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Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–
2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 300–312 
(2002); David A. Skeel, Jr., The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act 
and Its (Unintended) Consequences 8–10 (Univ. Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper 
No. 10-21, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690979. 
 154. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 147, at 477; Omarova, supra note 147, at 1688–91; 
Gordon & Muller, supra note 153, at 4; Skeel, supra note 153, at 3. 
 155. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 139, at 28 (“A related risk would exist if investors 
believe that the government would inevitably step in to save whatever private financial 
institutions or banks have become necessary to maintain the flow of mortgage credit.”). 
 156. See Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, Mortgage Default Risk and Real Estate Prices: 
The Use of Index-Based Futures and Options in Real Estate, 7 J. OF HOUSING RES. 243 (1996); 
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Models of House Prices, 36 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 249 (2008); Alan G. Ahearne, John 
Ammer, Brian M. Doyle, Linda S. Kole & Robert F. Martin, House Prices and Monetary 
Policy: A Cross-Country Study (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion 
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periods, all loans, including risky loans, are much less likely to default. The 
cyclicality of default risk is illustrated well by Figure 12 below. 
Figure 12 shows that although prime loans perform better than subprime loans 
and although fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) generally perform better than adjustable 
rate mortgages (ARMs), all loans performed much better during the boom period 
from late 2003 until mid-2006 than they did before or after. 
In fact, the cyclicality is so pronounced that risky subprime mortgages 
performed better during the 2004 to 2006 boom period than “safe” adjustable rate 
prime mortgages performed during the crisis from late 2008 on. 
 
Figure 12: Default risk is cyclical across loan classes 
 
 
In light of the cyclicality of default risk, proposals that the government withdraw 
except as a limited lender of last resort could be rephrased as follows: during 
prosperous times when unemployment is low, defaults are rare, and mortgage 
lending is highly profitable, the government will price itself out of the market and 
allow the profitable business of mortgage funding to be dominated by private 
financial institutions. During shocks to the economy when unemployment and 
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default risk are high, the government will rush in to guarantee loans at rates that are 
below what any private investor would demand. 
Private financial institutions have historically proven adept at converting 
emergency safety nets into ordinary course subsidies. Although the GSEs 
experienced steep losses from 2007 to 2010,157 they were highly profitable during 
the sixteen years from 1990 to 2006 and paid private investors tens of billions of 
dollars in dividends, as shown in Figure 13. And because the GSEs were highly 
leveraged, private shareholders captured substantial upside while putting minimal 
capital at risk, as shown in Figure 14. 
A number of studies have suggested that a significant portion of the GSEs’ 
profitability was due to their implied government guarantee.158 An implied 
guarantee enabled the GSEs to borrow cheaply even though they were highly 
leveraged, because creditors expected taxpayers instead of private capital to absorb 
any loss.159 Had these profits gone to benefit taxpayers—the largest holders of 
residual risk—instead of private investors—who absorbed limited losses—
taxpayers would be in a better position today. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. According to the companies’ financial statements, their aggregate net loss in those 
years exceeded $200 billion, largely due to provisions for loan losses (write downs of 
nonperforming assets). A number of scholars have suggested that most of these losses were 
due to write-downs of private label MBS purchased from non-GSE securitizers and held on 
their balance sheets, but reports from the GSEs’ conservator appear to suggest that most of 
the losses were due to guarantees of poor quality mortgages that originated in 2006 and 
2007. FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, CONSERVATOR’S REPORT ON THE ENTERPRISES’ FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE, SECOND QUARTER 2010 3 (2010); see also BELSKY & RICHARDSON, supra 
note 53, at 5–8; ELLEN ET AL., supra note 72, at 10; Dwight M. Jaffee, Reforming the U.S. 
Mortgage Market Through Private Market Incentives 9 (Nov. 15, 2010) (Conference Draft), 
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/conferences/gse/Jaffee.pdf; Jason Thomas & 
Robert Van Order, A Closer Look at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: What We Know, What 
We Think We Know and What We Don’t Know 1 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://business.gwu.edu/creua/research-papers/files/fannie-freddie.pdf. 
 158. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE HOUSING GSES 1 
(2001) (noting that the special legal status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as GSEs 
“enhances the perceived quality of the debt and mortgage-based securities . . . that they issue 
or guarantee and translates into a federal subsidy.”); W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 
Fussing and Fuming over Fannie and Freddie: How Much Smoke, How Much Fire?, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 159, 164 (“Evidence suggests that financial markets believe 
that the federal government would come to the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and 
hence their creditors) in the event of financial difficulties. As a result of this perceived 
implicit guarantee, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can typically borrow at interest rates that 
are more favorable than [their stand-alone rating].”); Wayne Passmore, The GSE Implicit 
Subsidy and the Value of Government Ambiguity, 33 REAL EST. ECON. 465, 466 (2005) 
(“Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s ambiguous relationship to the government imparts an 
implicit subsidy to GSE shareholders and homeowners.”). 
 159. Frame & White, supra note 158, at 174 (“Because of the implied guarantee, 
creditors do not monitor the firms’ activities as closely as they otherwise would. As a 
consequence of this reduced monitoring, the managements of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
can engage in activities that involve greater risk (with greater liability consequences for the 
government), since the companies’ owners will benefit from the ‘upside’ outcomes while 
being buffered (because of the limited liability of corporate owners) from the full 
consequences of large ‘downside’ outcomes.”). 
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Figure 13: GSEs were profitable in the decade and a half before the financial 
crisis and paid substantial dividends 
 
 
Figure 14: GSEs’ shareholders captured outsized returns while risking 
minimal capital 
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GSEs are not the only financial institutions that extracted transfers from 
taxpayers. Many other financial institutions have also converted safety nets into 
subsidies. 
Professor Saule Omarova has demonstrated that since the passage of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and for a decade before the financial crisis of 2008, the 
Federal Reserve Board repeatedly authorized large private financial institutions to 
subsidize their lightly regulated, high-risk subsidiaries through their government-
backed, regulated, deposit-taking subsidiaries by suspending the restrictions of 
section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.160 
Government guarantees and subsidies earmarked to stabilize a limited set of 
systemically important financial activities “leaked” through “firewalls” and were 
used—with the Federal Reserve's authorization—to enhance private financial 
institutions' profitability.161 Rather than being used to stabilize firms through a 
short-term injection of liquidity, these subsidies were used by private financial 
institutions to take greater risks at taxpayers’ expense.162 
Implicit or explicit government guarantees to private financial institutions 
perpetuate a system in which safety net subsidies flow to private financial 
institutions, while taxpayers continue to take on large downside risk with little 
upside potential. On the other hand, if the government could participate more 
actively in the mortgage funding market during normal times, it might recapture the 
subsidies that now flow to private investors.163 
C. Reinsurance Adds Agency Cost and Complexity 
The Treasury’s privatization proposals include a hybrid model with the 
government reinsuring private mortgage insurance companies. Like the GSEs, 
government-backed private mortgage insurers (GB-PMIs) would have incentives to 
maximize short-term profits for the benefit of executives and private shareholders. 
The GB-PMIs could, for example, underprice insurance to chase market share and 
increase revenue while paying out accounting “profits” as dividends and 
compensation. In other words, GB-PMIs could easily maximize “profits” by 
increasing long-term risks to government guarantors. 
Positioning the government at the reinsurance level exacerbates information 
asymmetries and thereby puts the government at a disadvantage. Rather than 
analyzing and evaluating simple individual mortgage loans prior to guaranteeing 
them and tracking the performance of particular mortgage originators—as the GSEs 
do now—the government would be limited to evaluating the aggregated credit-
worthiness of six huge insurers, each exposed to the risk of millions of mortgages 
in complex ways governed by the provisions of insurance and reinsurance 
contracts. 
Prior to the financial crisis, many professional investors poorly evaluated 
mortgage credit risk when it was placed in similarly complicated, aggregated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. Omarova, supra note 147, at 1700–24. 
 161. Id. at 1700–56. Professor Omarova documents guarantee leakage both before and 
during the financial crisis. 
 162. Id. at 1724–25. 
 163. See, e.g., IMMERGLUCK, supra note 4, at 215. 
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packages such as private mortgage-backed securities,164 collateralized debt 
obligations,165 and credit default swaps on collateralized debt obligations.166 
Similarly, the GSEs suffered far higher loss rates from the private MBS they 
purchased and retained on their balance sheet than from individual mortgage loans 
that they packaged and guaranteed.167 There is little reason to believe that the 
government would fare well today when faced with the complexity and opacity 
inherent in reinsurance. 
Placing the government at the primary insurance level, where the government 
could analyze individual loan data—the position currently occupied by the FHA, 
VA, Ginnie Mae, and the GSEs—would substantially simplify credit analysis and 
risk management.168 The institutional ability to analyze loans in granular detail 
would also reduce the government’s dependence on private financial institutions 
and thereby reduce those institutions’ ability to extract bailouts. 
V. GOVERNMENT PRESSURE PROBABLY DID NOT DRIVE LOOSE UNDERWRITING 
To the extent that academics have cited government policy as a cause of the 
financial crisis, they have generally focused on federal preemption of state 
antipredatory lending laws, failures to strengthen or enforce existing consumer 
protection laws or adequately inspect mortgage lenders, and other lapses and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. See ELLEN ET AL., supra note 72, at 4; Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, 
Information Failure and the U.S. Mortgage Crisis, in THE AMERICAN MORTGAGE SYSTEM: 
CRISIS AND REFORM 243, 243 (Susan M. Wachter & Marvin M. Smith eds., 2011) 
(“[M]arkets failed to price risk correctly because of an informational failure, caused by the 
complexity and heterogeneity of private-label mortgage-backed securities . . . .”); Joshua 
Coval, Jakub Jurek & Erik Stafford, The Economics of Structured Finance, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Winter 2009, at 3; Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 
100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2011). 
 165. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 18, 190–212; Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart, The 
Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis 13–15 (March 19, 2009) 
(unpublished B.A. thesis, Harvard University), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/students/dunlop/2009-CDOmeltdown.pdf. 
 166. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of 
Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1 (2010) (finding that 
investors in monoline insurers failed to react to credit downgrades of collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) to which the monoline insurers were exposed); Kristin N. Johnson, 
Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 
192 (2011); Judge, supra note 4, at 681–86; Simkovic, Secret Liens, supra note 3, at 273–74 
(discussing analytic challenges of analyzing CDS on CDOs, even with full disclosure); id. at 
283–87 (showing that even highly sophisticated investment banks failed to accurately judge 
AIG’s mortgage risk exposures); Michael Simkovic, Bankruptcy Immunities, Transparency, 
and Capital Structure, Presentation Before the World Bank Task Force, Bankruptcy 
Treatment of Financial Contracts (Jan. 11, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1738539 (same). 
 167. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 123, 316; BELSKY & RICHARDSON, supra note 
53; ELLEN ET AL., supra note 72, at 5 (“It may simply be true that the GSE risk managers 
were not able to obtain as much information on the quality of the underlying mortgages 
backing the securities purchased for the portfolio, thereby increasing uncertainty and 
exacerbating risks.”). 
 168. Figure 11 above suggests that the GSEs and, to a lesser extent, the FHA and VA 
were better than average underwriters compared to most other financial institutions. 
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weaknesses in regulation that permitted industry participants to take greater risks 
and make greater short-term profits.169 In other words, scholars have blamed the 
government for inaction and excessive deference to the industry. 
By contrast, some commentators have argued that lax underwriting was not 
caused by regulatory weakness and unfettered profit-seeking but was instead 
caused by government pressure on financial institutions to promote home 
ownership among low-income individuals. These commentators generally point to 
two government policies: the Community Reinvestment Act170 (CRA) and 
affordable housing goals for the GSEs that were established by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).171 
A. Industry Has Sought to Defend Itself by Blaming Government 
Arguments that government pressure on private financial institutions caused 
high-risk mortgage underwriting have generally been made in the context of 
advocacy paid for by the financial industry. Industry-funded research on legal or 
economic policy issues must be carefully scrutinized. Academic journals require 
authors to disclose funding sources so that readers are alerted to potential biases 
affecting authors’ analyses.172 Industry funding of research is affiliated with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. See IMMERGLUCK, supra note 4, at 41–46, 167–96; Lei Ding, Roberto G. Quercia, 
Carolina K. Reid & Alan M. White, The Impact of Federal Preemption of State 
Antipredatory Lending Laws on the Foreclosure Crisis, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 367 
(2012); Daniel Immergluck, Private Risk, Public Risk: Public Policy, Market Development, 
and the Mortgage Crisis, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 465–85 (2009); David Reiss, The 
Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: 
Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1033–35 (2008); see also infra note 
214 and accompanying text. 
 170. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 443–44, 524–32 (dissenting statement of Peter J. 
Wallison) (“[T]he Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 . . . [was one of the] government 
social policy mandates responsible for the mortgage meltdown and the financial crisis.”). 
Wallison relies heavily on research by Edward Pinto. Id. at 451 n.4. “The CRA was enacted 
in 1977 to [prevent banks from] denying credit to individuals and businesses in certain 
neighborhoods without regard to their creditworthiness. The CRA requires [certain 
depository institutions] to lend, invest, and provide services to the communities from which 
they take deposits, consistent with bank safety and soundness.” Id. at xxvii. The CRA does 
not apply to mortgage brokers. Id. at 162. 
 171. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 452–54, 487–519 (dissenting statement of Peter 
J. Wallison). 
 172. See, e.g., Stanford Law Review, Ethics Policy (August 2012) (on file with Indiana 
Law Journal) (“All authors must disclose any conflict of interest. This includes any financial 
interest that may be affected by the results or conclusions in the submission. This also 
includes any source of outside funding for the submission that may have affected or biased 
the assumptions, results or conclusions in the submission—e.g., any payment received by an 
outside organization to complete the work.”); Yale Law Journal, Volume 122 Submission 
Guidelines (2011) (on file with Indiana Law Journal) (“Authors must identify any 
organizations that provided funding for the research or writing of the manuscript, as well as 
any personal or family financial interests that might be pertinent to the piece’s 
conclusions.”). 
2013] COMPETITION AND CRISIS IN MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION 259 
 
scientifically questionable proindustry conclusions in pharmaceutical research,173 
nutritional research,174 and environmental research.175 
Many of the most forceful proponents of government pressure as the cause of 
poor underwriting—such as mortgage consultant Edward Pinto and FCIC 
dissenting member Peter J. Wallison176—are employed by “think tanks” such as the 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI), which fundraise based on their efforts to 
deflect blame for the financial crisis from private financial institutions and which 
are committed to advocating free market ideology and limited government.177 “AEI 
is governed by a Board of Trustees, composed of leading business and financial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 173. See, e.g., Justin E. Bekelman, Yan Li & Cary P. Gross, Scope and Impact of 
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 
454 (2003); Joel Lexchin, Lisa A. Bero, Benjamin Djulbegovic & Otavio Clark, 
Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic 
Review, 326 BMJ 1167 (2003); Sergio Sismondo, How Pharmaceutical Industry Funding 
Affects Trial Outcomes: Causal Structures and Responses, 66 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1909 
(2008). 
 174. See Barrie Margetts, Editorial, Stopping the Rot in Nutrition Science, 9 PUB. HEALTH 
NUTRITION 169 (2006); Tommy Boone, Is Sports Nutrition for Sale?, PROFESSIONALIZATION 
EXERCISE PHYSIOLOGY ONLINE (July 2004), 
http://faculty.css.edu/tboone2/asep/IsSportsNutritionForSale.html. 
 175. The hydrocarbon/energy industry has funded numerous attacks on the science 
behind global warming, although virtually none of them have survived peer review and 
virtually all peer-reviewed scientific research supports the theory of man-made global 
warming. See ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE CLIMATE CRISIS, THE COVER-UP, THE 
PRESCRIPTION (updated ed. 1998); NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF 
DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO 
SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING (2010); JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL, THE INQUISITION OF 
CLIMATE SCIENCE (2011); Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Climate Change Denial: 
Sources, Actor, and Strategies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
SOCIETY 240 (Constance Lever-Tracy ed., 2010); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 30–39 (“Warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal . . . . There is very high confidence that the global average net effect of human 
activities since 1750 has been one of warming . . . . Most of the observed increase in global 
average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic [Green House Gas] concentrations.”) (emphasis in original), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html. 
 176. Peter J. Wallison has been affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 
since the mid-1990s. AEI SHADOW FIN. REGULATORY COMM., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, 
available at http://www.aei.org/print/1999-annual-report. AEI’s 2009 annual report lists 
Peter J. Wallison as its Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Financial Policy Studies. AEI, 2009 
ANNUAL REPORT 21, available at http://aei.org/files/2009/12/18/2009-Annual-Report.pdf. 
AEI’s 2010 annual report lists Edward Pinto as a member of its research staff and a Resident 
Fellow. AEI, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, available at http://aei.org/files/1969/12/31/2010-
Annual-Report.pdf. 
 177. Why Should I Invest in AEI?, AEI, http://www.aei.org/support/why-should-i-invest-in-aei 
(encouraging donors to “invest” in AEI because AEI “is promoting market-driven approaches as 
the solution to our current woes and not their cause”). AEI describes “strengthening free 
enterprise” as one of its “unchanging ideals.” Id. AEI encourages corporations and wealthy 
individuals to “support AEI” by assuring them that “[a] donation to AEI is fully tax-deductible 
and is a sound investment in limited government [and] private enterprise.” AEI’s Organization 
and Purposes, AEI, http://web.archive.org/web/20110504235222/http://www.aei.org/about. 
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executives.”178 During the five-year period from 2005 to 2009, the vast majority of 
its revenues came from annual donations.179 
AEI’s 2009 report trumpeted Wallison and other AEI-funded writers’ efforts to 
deflect blame for the financial crisis from private financial firms and to place the 
blame for the financial crisis on government policies.180 The report also highlighted 
AEI’s ability to influence “Financial Regulation’s Future” because of Wallison’s 
role on the FCIC.181 The report suggested that Wallison would likely use the 
opportunity to blame the GSEs for the financial crisis and to combat more 
comprehensive financial regulation.182 
AEI’s 2010 annual report points out that Wallison, in his role as a dissenting 
member of the FCIC, did in fact blame government policy for the financial crisis.183 
The report reiterates Wallison’s opposition to regulation and his ability to influence 
legislation.184 Wallison’s unwavering efforts to blame GSEs and government 
policies for the financial crisis were criticized by other members of the FCIC, 
including fellow Republicans.185 
The controversial provenance of the claims that government pressure compelled 
financial institutions to make risky loans against their better judgment does not 
render these arguments wrong per se, but it does call for close scrutiny. The claims 
are prima facie implausible in light of the strong performance of GSE loans (and, to 
a lesser extent, FHA and VA loans) compared to loans in less-regulated private 
label securitizations.186 The claims also seem dubious in light of the fact that as 
GSE market share contracted and private label securitization grew, vintage loan 
performance deteriorated.187 Furthermore, as will be discussed below, the evidence 
of a causal connection between government pressure on financial institutions and 
risky lending by those institutions is weak. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 178. Board of Trustees, AEI, http://www.aei.org/about/board-of-trustees. AEI’s “National 
Council”—presumably large individual donors and fundraisers—is also largely comprised of 
leading financial executives. See National Council, AEI, http://www.aei.org/about/national-
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 179. See AEI, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, available at http://www.aei.org/files/2002/ 
12/07/20061220_2006ARweb.pdf; AEI, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, available at 
http://www.aei.org/files/2002/12/07/20071227_45600_AEI_LowRes.pdf; AEI, 2008 ANNUAL 
REPORT, available at http://www.aei.org/files/2002/12/07/20081205_2008AnnualReportweb.pdf; 
AEI, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 176; AEI, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 176. 
 180. AEI, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 176, at 2. 
 181. Id. at 3. 
 182. Id. at 3, 4. 
 183. AEI, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 176, at 2. 
 184. Id. at 2, 3. 
 185. Louise Radnofsky & Alan Zibel, Democrats Pounce as Oversight Panel Calls Off 
Hearing, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (July 13, 2011, 1:39 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/07/13/democrats-pounce-as-oversight-panel-calls-off-
hearing/ (“[E]mails show[] Republican commission member Peter Wallison trying to persuade his 
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their staffs shows [sic] they thought Mr. Wallison ‘overplays’ the argument that government 
housing policy caused the 2008 financial meltdown and they expressed concerns that Mr. 
Wallison was ‘intractable.’”). 
 186. See supra Part III.F. 
 187. See supra Part III.E. 
2013] COMPETITION AND CRISIS IN MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION 261 
 
B. There Is No Evidence that the Community Reinvestment Act Caused the 
Financial Crisis 
The claim that the CRA caused the financial crisis is not supported by empirical 
evidence. In his FCIC dissenting opinion, the only data Wallison provides to 
support this hypothesis is a table showing annual and cumulative dollar volumes of 
low-income lending to which financial institutions committed from 1977 to 
2007.188 This table not only fails to establish causation, but it fails to even establish 
a connection between commitments under the CRA and actual lending activity. 
Wallison acknowledged that lenders appear to have frequently failed to fulfill their 
commitments and that the available data makes it “impossible to determine how 
many loans were actually made under . . . CRA commitments.”189 Furthermore, 
according to Wallison, even “[w]here these loans are today must necessarily be a 
matter of speculation.”190 The handful of academic articles suggesting that the CRA 
might have caused the financial crisis also do not present empirical evidence to 
support this claim.191 
There is, however, substantial empirical evidence that the CRA was not a 
significant cause of the financial crisis.192 Empirical studies by two different teams 
of Federal Reserve economists both suggest that CRA lending accounted for a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 527 tbl.13 (dissenting statement of Peter J. 
Wallison). Wallison also lists specific commitments by four large banks. Id. at 529. 
 189. Id. at 530. Even if one were to assume that the annual commitments contained in 
Wallison’s Table 13 were proportional to CRA lending, there is no correlation with 
deterioration in underwriting quality. Whereas underwriting standards generally improved 
from 2000 to 2003, annual commitments increased during this time period. Whereas 
underwriting standards generally worsened from 2004 to 2007, CRA commitments 
decreased. See, e.g., supra Figures 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 190. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 530 (dissenting statement of Peter J. Wallison). 
Wallison blames the lack of data on what he claims was “the dilatory nature of the 
Commission’s investigation” although he admits that the banks the FCIC contacted 
“supplied only limited information. They contended that they did not have the information or 
that it was too difficult to get, and the information they supplied was sketchy at best.” Id. 
The banks also missed deadlines for submissions of materials to the FCIC. Id. Wallison does 
not explain why private financial institutions—which would presumably be eager to 
demonstrate that government policies rather than their own failures led to the financial 
crisis—would fail to timely provide supporting data. 
 191. See, e.g., Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining 
Cause and Effect, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 33 (2009). 
 192. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 72, 219–21; IMMERGLUCK, supra note 4, at 
162–66. 
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minority of subprime lending193 and that CRA loans performed better than 
subprime loans that were driven purely by market considerations.194 
C. “Synthetic” Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) Suggest that Risk Taking 
Was Market Driven 
Further evidence that subprime lending was driven by market forces rather than 
government affordable housing policies comes from the existence of a multibillion-
dollar “synthetic” CDO market. Traditional CDOs were investment vehicles that 
purchased securitized bonds and were major investors in subprime MBS. Synthetic 
CDOs provided investors with similar risk exposures but did not actually fund any 
new mortgages. Rather than purchase MBS and thereby fund mortgages, synthetic 
CDOs used credit default swaps to enable investors to make side bets on the 
performance of existing MBS or CDOs. Even if the government was trying to 
promote affordable housing, it had no reason to play any role in the synthetic CDO 
market. 
These synthetic instruments existed to a large extent because, at the height of the 
mortgage boom, investor demand for U.S. mortgage exposure exceeded 
originators’ and securitizers’ capacity.195 It is far more time consuming and labor 
intensive to originate and aggregate billions of dollars in mortgages than to simply 
match investors willing to place opposite bets on the performance of existing MBS. 
The existence of the synthetic CDO market suggests that investors’ appetites for 
risk exceeded any floor supposedly set by government affordable housing policies. 
D. Mortgage Lenders Lobbied Against Safe-Lending Regulations 
Additional evidence that market forces pushed toward greater risk taking comes 
from lobbying activity of mortgage lenders. If government pressure were forcing 
lenders to lend imprudently against their wishes, one would expect the lenders who 
lobbied most aggressively on issues related to underwriting regulation to receive 
dispensation that would enable them to have more conservative underwriting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 193. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at xxvii, 220; Neil Bhutta & Glenn B. Canner, Did 
the CRA Cause the Mortgage Market Meltdown?, COMMUNITY DIVIDEND (Fed. Reserve 
Bank Minneapolis), Mar. 2009 (finding that 6% of subprime loans, defined as high-cost 
loans under HMDA, had any connection to the CRA); Elizabeth Laderman & Carolina Reid, 
Lending in Low- and Moderate-Income Neighborhoods in California: The Performance of 
CRA Lending During the Subprime Meltdown (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper 
2008-05, 2008) (finding that in California, non-CRA-regulated mortgage brokers devoted a 
higher proportion of their lending to high priced loans than CRA-regulated institutions). 
 194. Bhutta & Canner, supra note 193 (finding that loans made by lenders regulated 
under the CRA in the neighborhoods in which they were required to lend were half as likely 
to default as similar loans made in the same neighborhoods by independent mortgage 
originators not subject to the law); Laderman & Reid, supra note 193, at 20 (finding that 
loans by CRA-regulated lenders in CRA assessment areas were half as likely to default as 
similar loans made by independent mortgage companies not subject to CRA, and concluding 
that “this suggests that the CRA, and particularly its emphasis on loans made within a 
lender’s assessment area, helped to ensure responsible lending, even during a period of 
overall declines in underwriting standards”). 
 195. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at xxiv, 142–46; Barnett-Hart, supra note 165. 
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practices. However, the opposite appears to be true—the lenders who lobbied most 
aggressively had the riskiest underwriting practices and generally lobbied against 
substantive limits on their ability to take risk.196 This suggests that government 
regulation was for the most part a restraining force that pushed toward more 
conservative underwriting. 
E. HUD Affordable Housing Goals Played at Most a Limited Role 
The argument that HUD affordable housing goals led to greater risk taking may 
have some merit. The GSEs’ failure was due at least in part to losses they suffered 
on highly rated tranches of nonprime MBS that the GSEs purchased from private 
securitizers, and which the GSEs held in portfolio on their balance sheets.197 
Why the GSEs purchased private label MBS remains open to debate, with some 
contending that the GSEs were attempting to meet affordable housing goals 
imposed on them by HUD, and others contending that the GSEs purchased these 
securities because they offered high yields, were highly rated by the rating 
agencies, and seemed to be a profitable investment that would benefit GSE 
shareholders.198 
It may not be possible to ever conclusively determine the GSEs’ motivation. But 
this much is clear: the GSEs made the same mistake that many other buy-side 
financial institutions made—trusting underwriting at non-GSE securitizers and 
private label MBS ratings—and those other investors could not have been driven 
by HUD’s affordable housing goals for the GSEs.199 
                                                                                                                 
 
 196. See Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying 
and the Financial Crisis (IMF, Working Paper WP/09/287, 2009) (finding that lenders who 
lobbied on issues related to substantive regulation of mortgage underwriting engaged in 
riskier lending than lenders who did not lobby). 
 197. See supra note 157. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac reportedly securitized a very low 
percentage of Alt-A securitizations (11% in 2005 and 12% in 2006) and 0% of subprime 
loans. BELSKY & RICHARDSON, supra note 53, at 7. However, they purchased the highest 
rated tranches securitized by the private banks. Id. at 5. 
 198. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at xxvii (“Based on the evidence and interviews 
with dozens of individuals involved in this subject area, we determined these [HUD 
affordable housing] goals only contributed marginally to Fannie’s and Freddie’s 
participation in those mortgages.”); id. at 123–125; ELLEN ET AL., supra note 72 at 5 (“While 
it appears that the primary impetus for [the GSEs’] movement into risky, nonprime 
investments was the higher interest rates that these investments paid, there is considerable 
debate about whether the GSEs were also motivated by their need to meet the affordability 
goals mandated by Congress.”) (citation omitted); Thomas & Van Order, supra note 157, at 
1 (finding that the GSEs “did build a large portfolio of AAA-rated PLS, probably in response 
to affordable housing goals”); Dwight M. Jaffee, Testimony Before the FCIC: The Role of 
the GSEs and Housing Policy in the Financial Crisis 4–5 (Feb. 27, 2010), available at 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0227-Jaffee-ppt.pdf. 
 199. Private institutions including Citi, insurers AIG, Ambac, MBIA, and several 
European banks all were sufficiently exposed to subprime MBS that they either became 
insolvent or would likely have become insolvent but for government intervention. See, e.g., 
Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivatives 
Disclosure During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1 (2010); Simkovic, Secret Liens, 
supra note 3. 
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Although the GSEs were large purchasers of private label securities, GSE 
purchases never constituted a majority of the private label MBS market, and other 
investors became increasingly important as the underlying loan quality 
deteriorated. From 2001 to 2008, the GSEs purchased approximately 30% of 
subprime private label MBS and approximately 10% of Alt-A private label MBS. 
GSE purchases grew from 2001 to 2004 and then declined from 2004 to 2008.200 
As previously noted, the worst performing loans were originated in 2004 to 2007. 
In 2004 to 2006, overall subprime and Alt-A private label MBS volume 
increased,201 meaning that many other investors stepped up their purchase activity 
at the worst possible time, providing funding as the GSEs withdrew. 
Although the GSEs reduced their purchase activity as the quality of the 
underlying collateral deteriorated, their policy shift may have had less to do with 
investment acumen than with regulatory pressure following an accounting 
scandal.202 Notwithstanding their portfolio losses, overall GSE loan delinquency 
rates are still substantially below those of most other market participants.203 
VI. DODD-FRANK REGULATION MAY NOT BE ENOUGH TO PREVENT ANOTHER 
CRISIS 
Theoretically, the government could protect taxpayers from another race to the 
bottom in a fragmented, competitive mortgage securitization market by 
implementing strong, uniform underwriting and compensation regulations and 
funding a powerful enforcement agency. In practice, recent regulatory changes 
constitute modest reforms backed by limited resources. 
A. High-Risk Loans Can Still Be Originated 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) includes reforms that move the U.S. mortgage market toward more 
standardized minimum underwriting and documentation standards. Under Dodd-
Frank, mortgage lenders must evaluate whether a prospective borrower is likely to 
be able to repay the mortgage and only originate the mortgage if the borrower is 
likely to repay.204 The bases for this determination must be objective factors such as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 124 fig.7.3. GSE subprime MBS purchases peaked 
at slightly below 40% in 2003 to 2004, and dropped to closer to 25% by 2006 to 2007. Id. 
GSE Alt-A MBS purchases peaked around 25% in 2004 and declined to around 5% by 2006 
to 2007. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. According to the FCIC, the GSEs’ pullback from private label MBS purchases was 
related to increased scrutiny and pressure they faced following accounting scandals. 
According to their regulator, the GSEs manipulated their financial reporting in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s to increase payments to senior executives under incentive compensation 
plans. FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 122–23, 180, 310–11. For a summary of the 
accounting scandals, see Reiss, supra note 169, at 1035–39. 
 203. See supra Figure 11. 
 204. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2011) (“[N]o creditor may make a residential 
mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on 
verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the 
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credit history, current income, expected income, current obligations, debt-to-
income ratio, employment status, and other measures of financial resources.205 
Income must be verified through W-2s, tax returns, payroll receipts, or financial 
institution records.206 
These reforms are a step in the right direction, but they may not go far enough: 
the statute itself includes exceptions which can be exploited; detailed rulemaking is 
delegated to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a regulatory 
agency with huge responsibilities and limited resources; and enforcement built 
around consumer protection may not adequately protect the interests of taxpayers. 
A major limitation of Dodd-Frank is that it does not standardize underwriting 
criteria per se, but instead provides a list of factors that originators should consider 
and documentation that they should collect. Detailed rulemaking is delegated to the 
CFPB. 
Dodd-Frank establishes a two-tiered origination market in which more 
restrictive, detailed rules are reserved for “qualified residential mortgages” 
(QRMs). The primary advantage to originators of QRMs is that they are exempt 
from risk retention requirements of at least 5%. In other words, originators and 
securitizers need only be concerned about more restrictive QRM rules if they are 
unwilling to retain a small fraction of the mortgages they originate. 
A full discussion of QRM rules is beyond the scope of this Article, but minimal 
risk retention requirements may not fundamentally alter the economic rationale for 
issuing and then securitizing risky mortgages. Though more restrictive, “qualified 
mortgages” can still include risky features such as adjustable interest rates and, 
under certain circumstances, interest-only or negative amortization loans.207 
B. Compensation Can Still Create Perverse Incentives 
Many scholars have argued that compensation schemes for financial 
professionals contributed to the financial crisis because they established 
asymmetric, equity-like payoffs (high upside for success, limited downside for 
failure), prioritized short-term financial results over more reliable, long-term 
measures of value-creation, and thereby incentivized excessive risk taking.208 These 
                                                                                                                 
consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable 
taxes, insurance . . . and assessments.”). 
 205. Id. § 1639c(a)(3). 
 206. There is an exception to the income verification requirement for loans made, 
guaranteed, or insured by federal departments or agencies. Id. § 1639c(a)(4). It is unclear 
why loans explicitly backed by taxpayers are not subject to the same stringent income 
verification requirements as other loans. 
 207. 15 U.S.C. § 78o–11 (Supp. IV 2011). 
 208. See PATRICK BOLTON, HAMID MEHRAN & JOEL D. SHAPIRO, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
N.Y., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RISK TAKING (2010) (arguing that executive 
compensation based in part on debt prices will reduce risk for financial institutions); Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive 
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (2010) 
(reporting that the top five executives at two failed U.S. financial firms, Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers, were able to cash out large amounts of bonus compensation that was not 
clawed back when the firms failed, were able to sell large amounts of equity prior to their 
firms’ collapse, and became substantially wealthier during the 2000 to 2008 period); Lucian 
A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 
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scholars’ recommended reforms—compensation tied to long-term performance, 
less equity, and more debt-like compensation—are not mandated by Dodd-
Frank.209 Because financial institutions can still offer their equity holders and 
managers limited liability, high leverage, and huge upside potential, a high-risk 
strategy can still benefit shareholders and managers by transferring most of the 
downside risk to investors and much of the rest to taxpayers. 
Dodd-Frank also does not prevent originators from again using their 
compensation schemes to emphasize quantity of mortgages over quality of 
mortgages. Dodd-Frank does not prohibit originators from compensating loan 
officers based on the volume of loans they produce or how readily those loans can 
be sold.210 
C. Regulators Remain Vulnerable and Underfunded 
Dodd-Frank’s effectiveness may also be limited by its fragmented enforcement 
mechanisms. The principal rulemaking agency, the CFPB, cannot enforce its rules 
against depository institutions with less than $10 billion in assets and must instead 
rely on those institutions’ prudential regulators.211 Because there are many different 
prudential regulators, the door remains open for uneven enforcement and regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
(2010) (discussing implementation challenges for incentive-based pay in light of hedging 
opportunities available to executives); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating 
Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010); Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO 
Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11 (2011) (finding some evidence that 
banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders 
performed worse during the financial crisis and no evidence that they performed better); 
Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management 
Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 95 (2011); Rangarajan K. Sundaram & 
David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation, 62 
J. FIN. 1551 (2007) (reporting that CEOs with high debt incentives manage firms 
conservatively); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive 
Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205 (2011) (reviewing the role of 
equity compensation in encouraging risk taking and arguing that financial managers should 
be compensated with subordinated debt instead of equity to make them more cautious); 
Divya Anantharaman, Vivian W. Fang & Guojin Gong, Inside Debt and the Design of 
Corporate Debt Contracts, Paper Presented at Fifth Singapore International Conference on 
Finance (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743634 (providing empirical 
evidence that creditors believe that it is safer to lend to firms in which managers hold a 
higher ratio of debt-to-equity than the firm as a whole); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, 
Reforming Executive Compensation: Simplicity, Transparency, and Committing to the Long-
Term (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Research 
Paper No. 393, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1506742 (arguing for restricted 
stock compensation); Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, 
and the Global Financial Crisis (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-49, 2011), 
available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2011.html (providing 
empirical evidence that inside debt compensation of CEOs is associated with better 
performance and less risk taking during the financial crisis). 
 209. Dodd-Frank’s compensation provisions generally rely on greater disclosure to 
shareholders and greater shareholder influence. 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1 (2006). Because 
shareholders should rationally prefer high-risk strategies, Dodd-Frank’s approach is unlikely 
to result in compensation schemes that reduce managers’ incentives to take risks. 
 210. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c. 
 211. 12 U.S.C. § 5516(d). 
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arbitrage. By contrast, to the extent that originators depend on the GSEs for 
financing, originators will face largely standard, uniform risk management 
practices and relatively swift penalties for noncompliance. 
The effectiveness of the CFPB will also likely be hampered by continued efforts 
to defund it and reduce its ability to operate independent of politics.212 Given the 
political influence of the financial services industry,213 it seems unlikely that the 
CFPB could effectively regulate underwriting if it were subject to annual 
appropriations by Congress.214 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. The CFPB is currently more insulated from political influence than most regulators. 
Under Section 1017 of the Dodd-Frank Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5947, the CFPB’s 
annual budget is not determined through congressional appropriation but is capped as a 
percentage of the Federal Reserve’s operating expenses. The cap is 10% in 2011, 11% in 
2012, and 12% in 2013. The funding mechanism also provides for adjustments for inflation. 
12 U.S.C. § 5947(a)(1)–(2). 
  Some Republican members of Congress have sought to repeal the provisions of Dodd-
Frank that protect the CFPB’s independence, to subject it to congressional appropriations, and 
to block the appointment of a director if the CFPB is not subject to annual appropriations and 
other measures to reduce its authority. See Phil Mattingly & Richard Rubin, Budget Cuts for 
Consumer Bureau, IRS Proposed by Republicans, BLOOMBERG.COM (June 15, 2011, 4:31 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-15/budget-cuts-for-consumer-bureau-irs-proposed-
by-republicans.html (reporting that House Republicans proposed to cut the CFPB’s budget to 
$200 million per year, down from the $500 million envisioned in Dodd-Frank, and to subject 
the agency to annual appropriations); see also Jessica Holzer, House Panel Targets Consumer 
Bureau, SEC Budgets, WSJ.COM (June 23, 2011, 6:01 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303339904576404102094921400.html 
(reporting that Republican law makers shepherded bills through the House Appropriations 
Committee that would shave hundreds of millions of dollars from the SEC and CFPB’s 
budgets). 
 213. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the finance, insurance, and real 
estate industries have spent over $4.8 billion in lobbying from 1998 to 2011—more than any 
sector except healthcare. Lobbying: Ranked Sectors, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=c. 
 214. Lender lobbying is associated with riskier underwriting practices. See supra note 
196 and accompanying text. Consumer protection regulation may help maintain financial 
system stability. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall 
Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2041–42 (2007); Erik F. 
Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between Consumer Financial Protection and 
Systemic Risk, 4 FLA. INT’L U.L. REV. 435 (2009) (arguing that consumer protection would 
promote stability by reducing the number of defaults, making defaults more predictable, and 
making defaults less correlated with one another); McCoy et al., supra note 90, at 1348–57 
(discussing federal preemption of state anti-predatory lending laws); Alan White, Carolina 
Reid, Lei Ding & Roberto G. Quercia, The Impact of State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws on 
the Foreclosure Crisis, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247 (2011) (providing empirical 
evidence that state anti-predatory lending laws reduced the likelihood of serious mortgage 
delinquency by 13%). 
  For the broader intellectual case for a politically independent regulator to ensure the 
safety of consumer financial services products, see Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making 
Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008); Ann Graham, The Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency: Love It or Hate It, U.S. Financial Regulation Needs It, 55 VILL. L. REV. 603 (2011); 
Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Georgetown Law Faculty Working 
Papers, Research Paper No. 1447082, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447082; 
Sharon L. Tennyson, Analyzing the Role of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Ind. State 
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The rationale claimed by members of Congress who wish to defund the CFPB—
budgetary necessity215—would be more difficult to apply to the risk management 
function of a government-owned enterprise that was profitable and entirely self-
funding. The CFPB’s budget—likely a few hundred million dollars spread across 
many consumer product markets—pales in comparison to the resources the GSEs 
can devote to the residential mortgage finance market. For example, in 2010, the 
GSEs’ administrative expenditures were over four billion dollars, focused entirely 
on managing the residential mortgage finance market.216 
CONCLUSION 
Recent experience in the U.S. mortgage securitization market illustrates how 
competition between financial institutions seeking market share can destabilize 
financial systems and ultimately result in losses to taxpayers. Mortgage 
underwriting and loan performance generally improved from 2000 to 2003, during 
a period of GSE dominance, and dramatically deteriorated from 2004 to 2007 as 
originators consolidated and intense competition from smaller, private securitizers 
reduced GSE influence. Although the GSEs appear to have relaxed their 
underwriting standards somewhat during this latter period, on the whole GSE loans 
remained far less default prone than those of smaller financial institutions, and the 
recent period of restored GSE dominance has been one of relatively pristine 
underwriting.217 
Competition can undermine originators’ and securitizers’ ability to effectively 
screen loans and securitizers’ ability to monitor and discipline originators. Profit-
driven institutions that do not wish to compete by reducing their revenues and 
profit margins can instead compete by taking on more risk, ultimately keeping most 
upside while transferring most downside risk to taxpayers. Competition is most 
dangerous when financial institutions serve underwriting functions—as mortgage 
                                                                                                                 
Univ. Networks Fin. Inst., Policy Brief 2009-PB-13, 2009), available at 
www.human.cornell.edu/pam/outreach/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=50052. 
  Critics of consumer protection regulation have focused on the possibility that such 
regulation might increase compliance costs for private financial institutions and that 
consumer credit might become more expensive or less available. See David S. Evans & 
Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 on 
Consumer Credit, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 277 (2010). But see Adam J. Levitin, A 
Critique of Evans and Wright’s Study of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act 
(Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Policy Working Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 1492471, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492471. 
 215. See Holzer, supra note 212 (“Rep. Jo Ann Emerson (R., Mo.) acknowledged that 
some Republicans want to hobble the agency created by the Dodd-Frank financial law by 
depriving it of funds. But she argued that . . . ‘With the debt that we’ve got right now, $200 
million is more than ample, more than fair for an agency that isn’t required to report to us . . . 
.’”). If fully funded at $500 million, the CFPB’s budget would equal less than 0.02% of the 
federal government’s $3.8 trillion budget for 2011. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 151 (2010). 
 216. 1 INSIDE MORTG. FIN., supra note 60, at 317. While the GSEs do not spend their 
entire administrative budget monitoring originators and mortgage quality, it is probably a 
safe bet that they spend more than the CFPB could ever hope to spend. 
 217. Nick Timiraos & Maurice Tamman, Tighter Lending Crimps Housing, WSJ.COM (June 25, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304569504576405660006330644.html. 
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originators and securitizers do—but may be less of a concern for institutions whose 
activities are purely administrative or transactional in nature.  
Perhaps competition could be channeled toward purely administrative functions 
that do not critically affect risk management or underwriting decisions.218 Perhaps 
competition on underwriting could be made safer under a different, idealized 
regulatory regime219 or a different, idealized system of compensation for financial 
professionals.220 However, it is an act of great faith to assume that incremental and 
largely untested financial reforms have established that idealized system and 
removed the threat of another race to the bottom if full-fledged competition is 
restored. 
While a system of suppressed competition may have its own flaws—perhaps 
mortgages would become more expensive, perhaps access to credit for marginal 
borrowers would be reduced—taxpayers would be safer. And to the extent that 
higher mortgage pricing results in higher profits and higher dividends to the 
Treasury—that is, if the government can capture the full upside of mortgage 
funding during profitable years, rather than taking only a minority of the upside 
through taxation and guarantee fees—profits could be used to repay the debt 
incurred during the most recent financial sector bailouts and to build reserves for 
future crises. 
The Treasury’s proposed approach—a gradual shrinking of the GSEs and 
FHA—could lead to a more fragmented, competitive, and dangerous securitization 
market in which for-profit institutions backed by implied government guarantees 
once again compete for market share and revenue. 
The results of this analysis are by no means definitive, but they raise questions 
about the Treasury’s assumptions and doubts about its proposals for reforming 
housing finance. At a minimum, more study should be undertaken before the 
Treasury moves forward with a program of radical reform. More traditional 
alternatives—such as a return to the concentrated, government-led market structure 
and conservative underwriting standards that prevailed from the mid-1940s to the 
late 1960s—should be considered in light of empirical evidence linking such 
structures to greater financial stability in the U.S. residential mortgage market. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 218. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 74, at 89 (describing how one large mortgage 
originator used specialization to cut costs and sell mortgages for 0.55% less than competing 
firms). Although this particular firm was engaged in fraudulent practices, efficiency is 
possible without fraud. Id. at 12–14, 89 (“For decades, a version of the originate-to-distribute 
model produced safe mortgages. Fannie and Freddie had been buying prime, conforming 
mortgages since the 1970s, protected by strict underwriting standards.”). 
 219. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 49, at 27 (arguing that 
although recent financial crises in the United States, Scandinavia, and Asia “suggest that 
liberalisation and competition contribute to financial crises . . . the relationship between 
competition and stability depends on the regulatory framework”); Andrea Beltratti & René 
M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country 
Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper 15180, 2009) (providing empirical evidence that banks in countries 
with more independent regulators and higher capital requirements performed better than 
other banks during the financial crisis); supra note 214 (discussing a possible link between 
consumer protection and financial system stability). 
 220. See supra note 208. 
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Instead of entertaining radical proposals for privatization, the federal 
government could focus on improving the operational efficiency of the many 
mortgage funding agencies that it now controls, reducing risks and boosting profits 
for taxpayers. There are now at least five government-controlled agencies that play 
a role in guaranteeing and funding mortgages—the FHA, the VA, Ginnie Mae, 
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. 
Greater efficiency, economies of scale, and increased market power could be 
realized by merging these entities’ mortgage operations into a single state-owned 
enterprise, streamlining redundant functions and reducing costs, integrating 
information systems and boosting loan sampling rates to better monitor loan 
originators, and analyzing the vast collective repository of ex post loan 
performance data to improve ex ante underwriting capabilities. 
Greater size and consolidated funding would enhance the ability to monitor 
originators, discipline those who originate risky loans, and maintain high, uniform 
underwritings standards. These improvements could be reinforced by granting the 
newly dedicated mortgage agency the exclusive right to securitize mortgages. 
The government could also use the size and market power of a single state-
owned mortgage enterprise to institute changes to mortgage industry compensation 
that could better align the interests of its employees with those of taxpayers. These 
changes could include tying a substantial portion of each individual employee’s 
compensation to the long-term performance of mortgage loans that the employee 
approves. 
There is a long-term risk, to be sure, of a state-owned enterprise succumbing to 
political pressure—just as there are risks of regulatory capture. It may be prudent 
for the government to commit, through legislation, to prioritize sound underwriting 
and long-term profitability for the benefit of taxpayers over targeted subsidies for 
favored political groups. 
Perhaps risks could also be mitigated through legislation granting political 
independence as long as certain benchmarks of operational efficiency are met. 
There are many examples of successful independent agencies and profitable state-
owned enterprises, such as the Government Accountability Office,221 the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey,222 and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel 
                                                                                                                 
 
 221. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was established in 1921 as an 
independent nonpartisan agency to investigate and improve the performance of federal 
government programs. According to the GAO, it has saved taxpayers $45.7 billion, an $81 
return for every dollar invested in the GAO. About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
http://www.gao.gov/about/; GAO at a Glance, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
http://www.gao.gov/about/gglance.html. 
 222. The Port Authority is a self-sustaining agency that builds, operates, and maintains 
systemically important transportation infrastructure—including airports, seaports, bridges, 
tunnels, a bus terminal, and a rail line—for one of the largest and most prosperous 
metropolitan areas in the world. Overview of Facilities and Services, PORT AUTHORITY N.Y. 
& NEW JERSEY, http://www.panynj.gov/about/facilities-services.html. It supports itself 
through use fees, not tax revenue, and can only borrow money against its own revenues and 
assets, not those of the state. Id. It has survived earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks. 
It has a high credit rating and the data suggests that it is financially sound. Id. From 2002 to 
2011, net assets increased from $5.9 to $11.7 billion and leverage ratios remained stable. 
PORT AUTHORITY OF N.Y. & N.J., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND APPENDED NOTES YEAR 2003, 
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Authority,223 most of which were founded during the heyday of the progressive era 
and have lasted nearly a century. 
Rather than rely solely on regulators with limited budgets, political 
vulnerability, and limited control over the financial institutions they regulate, the 
government could “regulate” the mortgage market directly by establishing 
corporate underwriting policy at a fully government owned and controlled 
mortgage funding agency. Such “regulations”—backed by trillions of dollars in 
purchasing power—are at least as likely to be effective as threats of sanctions from 
regulatory agencies, and could reinforce such agencies’ efforts to maintain prudent 
underwriting and protect taxpayers. 
If a state-owned enterprise proved to be loss-making over the long term and an 
unacceptable drain on taxpayer resources—and it would have to be very inefficient 
to rival the damage to public finance from private financial institutions’ risk taking 
activities during the recent crisis—privatization would always remain an option. 
Freely ceding market share to for-profit competitors—as a number of advocates of 
privatization propose—is unlikely to yield much in the way of returns for 
taxpayers. However, selling exclusive regional mortgage securitization licenses or 
an exclusive national license and the GSEs’ infrastructure to the highest bidder 
(and regulating underwriting and pricing at the private monopoly level thereby 
established) could be considered as an option that might better protect taxpayer 
interests while maintaining a stable, concentrated market structure. 
Given the GSEs relatively strong record on whole loan purchases, dominant 
secondary market position, and current de facto ownership by the government, they 
could be reformed into a powerful, permanent vehicle for long-term stabilization of 
the mortgage market and taxpayer protection. 
  
                                                                                                                 
at 4–5 (2004); PORT AUTHORITY OF N.Y. & N.J., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND APPENDED 
NOTES FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2011, at 6 (2012).  
 223. The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA) and its precursors 
constructed, operated, and maintained bridges and tunnels that connect the boroughs of New 
York City. The TBTA has long generated a surplus from toll revenue, which was used to 
fund construction of public beaches and parks and a convention center. After the TBTA was 
merged with the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) in 1968, TBTA surplus was used to 
subsidize mass transit. The TBTA is a cofounder of E-ZPass, a wireless electronic toll 
collection system used in 14 states. See Sam Roberts, Reappraising a Landmark Bridge, and 
the Visionary Behind It, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2006, at B6; Welcome to MTA Bridges and 
Tunnels, METRO. TRANSIT AUTH., http://www.mta.info/bandt/html/btintro.html. 
